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THE 1991 CONSTITUTION OF THAILAND
Ted L. McDormant
Abstract: In December 1991, Thailand enacted its fifteenth constitution since the
Thai military's overthrow of the absolute monarchy in 1932. As was the case with most
of the previous Thai constitutions, the promulgation of the 1991 Thai Constitution was
preceded by a military coup. Further conforming to Thailand's constitutional history and
tradition, the coup-leaders, after suspending the 1978 Constitution, attempted to enact a
new constitution legitimizing the military's role in the government. Yet they were less
successful than in the past as is indicated by the substance of the 1991 Constitution and
the events surrounding its enactment. The public became involved in the constitution-
drafting process by voicing its opposition to provisions empowering military and
government officials at the expense of elected representatives. Consequently, although
the executive branch of government remains dominant, the provisions of the 1991
Constitution afford the elected House of Representatives greater political power than in
the past vis-i-vis both the appointed Senate and the Council of Ministers. Moreover,
there appears to be a greater willingness by the judiciary to challenge government
actions, and several governmental reforms and constitutional amendments are currently
under consideration. Thus, while much of the past authoritarian constitutional tradition
remains intact in the 1991 Constitution, these changes signal the possible emergence of
new, more representative constitutional traditions in Thailand. This article analyzes the
events surrounding the enactment of the 1991 Constitution as well as the relevant provi-
sions of the new Constitution in light of Thailand's constitutional, political, social, and
cultural history.
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I. INTRODUCTION'
Since the end of the absolute monarchy in 1932,1 Thailand has been
ruled in accordance with written constitutions. There have been fifteen
constitutions, including the current Constitution promulgated in December
1991,2 to which must be correlated thirteen successful military coups and
eighteen elections. 3 Hence, the relationship between constitutions, coups
and elections has been described as the cycle of Thai politics: a military
coup suspends the old constitution; a new constitution is enacted; elections
are held; time passes until a perceived crisis leads to another military coup. 4
This cycle of Thai politics was re-enacted once again in 1991-92. In
late February 1991, the Thai military seized power from the civilian
government of Prime Minister Chatichai Choonhavan5 and suspended the
I For a detailed description see generally BENJAMIN A. BATSON, THE END OF THE ABSOLUTE
MONARCHY (1984).2 RADTHATHAMMANOON [Constitution] (B.E. 2534, Dec. 9, 1991), translated in CONSTITUTION OF
THE KINGDOM OF THAILAND (Int'l Translations Office trans., Thail., 1992). For the original Thai version
see 108 RAADCHAKIDJAA [ROYAL THAI GOV'T GAZETTE] pt. 216 (B.E. 2534, Dec. 9, 1991). An additional
English translation can be found in Sompong Sucharitkul, Kingdom of THAILAND, in CONSTITUTIONS OF
THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD (Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flanz eds., 1993).
3 Clark D. Neher, Political Succession in Thailand, 32 ASIAN SURV. 585, 586 (1992) [hereinafter
Nehe 1. See, e.g., Chai-anan Samudavanija, Thailand: A Stable Semi-democracy, in 3 DEMOCRACY IN
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: ASIA 305, 336 (L. Diamond et al. eds., 1989) [hereinafter Samudavanija];
LIKHIT DHIRAVEGIN, DEMI-DEMOCRACY: THE EVOLUTION OF THE THAI POLITICAL SYSTEM 147 (1992)
[hereinafter DHIRAVEGIN].
5 The coup is described in Suchit Bunbongkam, Thailand in 1991: Coping with Military
Guardianship, 32 ASIAN SURV. 131, 131-33 (1992) [hereinafter Bunbongkam]; Ananya Bhuchongkul,
Thailand 1991: The Return of the Military, in SOUTHEAST ASIAN AFFAIRS 1992, at 313, 313-18 (Inst. of
Southeast Asian Studies ed., 1992) [hereinafter Bhuchongkul]; Neher, supra note 3, at 596-98; Rodney
Tasker, Popular Putsch, FAR E. ECON. REV., Mar. 7, 1991, at 17-19; Seventeenth Time Unlucky,
ECONOMIST, Mar. 2, 1991, at 33-34.
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1978 Constitution. 6 Although several pretexts were given by the military
leaders for the coup, the alleged corruption of the Chatichai administration
was paraded as the principal reason. 7 The military takeover met with little
dismay in Thailand,8 particularly when the military leaders quickly prom-
ised a new constitution and elections, 9 established an interim constitution,10
and selected Anand Panyarachun as Prime Minister.11 The military coup,
however, did not follow the pattern of previous power usurpations as there
was no interference with political parties, the press, commerce or civil
liberties. 12
The new Constitution was enacted in December 1991, and elections
followed in March 1992.13 Yet the Thai political cycle was unexpectedly
6 RADTHATHAMMANOON [Constitution] (B.E. 2521, Dec. 22,1978), translated in CONSTITUTION OF
THE KINGDOM OF THAILAND (Int'l Translations Office trans., Thail., 1979). For the original Thai version
see 95 RAADCHAKIDJAA [ROYAL THAI GOV'T GAZETTE] pt. 146 (B.E. 2521, Dec. 22, 1978).
The following has been said about the 1978 Constitution: "The longevity of this Constitution is quite
remarkable, when considered against the background of turbulent Thai politics, and optimistic political
observers believe it could succeed in laying a strong foundation for the establishment of a secure demo-
cratic leadership that might become institutionalized eventually." Sombat Chantomvong & Montri
Chenvidyakam, Constitutional Rule and the Institutionalization of Leadership and Security in Thailand, in
LEADERSHIP AND SECURITY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 141, 142 (Stephen Chee ed., 1991) [hereinafter
Chantomvong & Chenvidyakam].
7 The real concern of the military had to do with possible loss of power and authority to a civilian
administration. See generally Bunbongkam, supra note 5, at 132-33; Neher, supra note 3, at 596-98, 605.
8 One Thai commentator observed that the coup "was viewed with ambivalence and at best it re-
ceived a lukewarm response from the public." DHIRAVEGIN, supra note 4, at 232. He goes on to note that
the Chatichai administration was viewed as corrupt which was compounded by high-handed behavior. Id.
Another observer commented: "For the general public, the coup seemed acceptable." Bunbongkarn, supra
note 5, at 132.
9 Bunbongkarn, supra note 5, at 133.
10 The 1991 Interim Constitution became Thailand's fourteenth constitutional document since 1932.
RADTHATHAMMANOON [Constitution] (B.E. 2534, Mar. 1, 1991), translated in CONSTITUTION FOR THE
ADMINISTRATION OF THE KINGDOM (Int'l Translations Office trans., Thail., 1991). For the original Thai
version see 108 RAADCHAKIDJAA [ROYAL THAI GOV'T GAZETTE] pts. 29, 37, 40. An English translation is
reprinted in 45 ROYAL THAI GOV'T nos. 1-3 (Int'l Translations Office trans, Thail., 1991). Pursuant to this
document, the National Peace-Keeping Council (the leaders of the military coup) could appoint and dis-
miss the prime minister and a National Legislative Assembly (NLA). The appointed NLA was to perform
the legislative function and draft a new constitution. Id § 6, para. I.
I Anand Panyarachun was known as a person of high integrity and not as a tool of the military. His
administration was very efficient, non-corrupt and on some issues successfully curtailed the will of the
military. See Bunbongkam, supra note 5, at 133-35; Neher, supra note 3, at 599; Rodney Tasker, Under
Licence, FAR E. ECON. REv., Mar. 21, 1991, at 13-14; Vithoon Amom, Military-installed Govt
Outperforms Expectations, BANGKOK POST WKLY. REV., Sept. 20, 1991, at 19; Paul Handley, Clearing the
Decks, FAR E. ECON. REV., Dec. 19, 1991, at 20-21. But cf David Peters, Paving the Way, MANAGER:
THAILAND'S BUSINESS MONTHLY, June 1993, at 16-26 (providing a less flattering review of Anand and his
period as Prime Minister).
12 Bhuchongkul, supra note 5, at 315.
13 Concerning the election see Neher, supra note 3, at 566-601; SURIN MAISRIKROD, THAILAND'S
Two GENERAL ELECTIONS IN 1992 4-25 (1992) [hereinafter MAISRIKROD]; Surin Maisrikrod, Thailand
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disrupted when the pro-military coalition which emerged as successful from
the March elections turned to General Suchinda Kraprayoon, the principal
coup leader, to become prime minister.14 Suchinda accepted the prime
ministership, despite having unequivocally stated previously he would not
do so, and he proceeded to appoint a cabinet containing many of the same
people he had earlier jettisoned from power.15 Demonstrations erupted in
Bangkok and elsewhere in the country against Suchinda's ascent to the
prime ministership and the clear intent of the military to retain political
control, and in May 1992, the military moved to quell the protesters with
force. 16  The Thai reaction to the deaths and brutality was shock,
embarrassment and outrage. The Reverend Monarch of Thailand, King
Bhumibol Adulyadej, brought the violence to a dramatic end by simultane-
ously meeting with Suchinda and the main opposition figure, Chamlong
Srimuang. 17 Suchinda stepped down, and following another intervention by
the Monarch, Anand became prime minister once again until the elections
of September 1992.18 The September election resulted in a different coali-
1992: Repression and Return of Democracy, in SOUTHEAST ASIAN AFFAIRS 1993, at 327, 327-29 (Inst. of
Southeast Asian Studies ed., 1993) [hereinafter Maisrikrod, Thailand 1992]; Picking Thailand's New
Leaders, ASIAWEEK, Apr. 3, 1992, at 25.
14 The first choice of the pro-military coalition for Prime Minister, Narong Wongwan, the leader of
the party which obtained the most seats in the March 1992 election, proved to be an embarrassment
because of suspected links to drug trafficking. It was following these revelations that Suchinda was nomi-
nated for Prime Minister. See Neher, supra note 3, at 601; Maisrikrod, Thailand 1992, supra note 13, at
329-330; The Man Who Would Be PM, ASIAWEEK, Apr. 10, 1992, at 32; Rodney Tasker, Premier of Last
Resort, FAR E. ECON. REV., Apr. 16, 1992, at 10-11.15 Neher, supra note 3, at 601-02; MAISRIKROD, supra note 13, at 24-25.
16 For a concise review and analysis of the May events see MAISRIKROD, supra note 13, at 26-39;
Maisrikrod, Thailand 1992, supra note 13, at 330-34; see also Paul Handley, People's Wrath, FAR E.
ECON. REV., May 28, 1992, at 10-11; Paul Handley, An Uneasy Calm, FAR E. ECON. REV., May 21, 1992,
at 10-11; Thailand, the Generals and the King, ECONOMIST, May 23, 1992, at 35-36; Uneasy Calm after
King Intervenes, BANGKOK POST WKLY. REV.. May 29, 1992, at 1-2; Thailand Licks its Wounds,
ECONOMIST, May 30, 1992, at 33-34; Paul Handley, Counting the Cost, FAR E. ECON. REV., June 4, 1992,
at 10-1I; Paul Handley, Rainbow Coalition, FAR E. ECON. REV., June 4, 1992, at 11-12. The death toll
from the violence is uncertain. Fifty-two bodies were recovered but there is a discrepancy between forty-
seven and 163 regarding the number of missing. Paul Handley, Still Missing, FAR E. ECON. REV., May 27,
1993, at 16. An analysis of Suchinda and the military's miscalculation regarding the use of force is pro-
vided by Neher, supra note 3, at 603-04.
ItMAISRIKROD, supra note 13, at 33; Neher, supra note 3, at 604; Maisrikrod, Thailand 1992, supra
note 13, at 331,334; King Gives Advice to Help End Crisis, BANGKOK POST WKLY. REV., May 29, 1992, at
20; Cynthia Owens, Deliberate Actions of Thai Royal Family Follow Precedent Set During 1973 Crisis,
ASIAN WALL ST. J., May 25, 1992, at 3.
18 Neher, supra note 3, at 604; Rodney Tasker, The Ringmaster Returns, FAR E. ECON. REV., June
25, 1992, at 8-9; Anand Appointed Premier, BANGKOK POST WKLY. REV., June 19, 1992, at I.
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tion gaining the most seats, and Chuan Leekpai, leader of the coalition
partner with the largest representation, became prime minister.19
Debate about the form and substance of a new constitution figured
prominently in the 1991-92 political convulsions. During the drafting of the
1991 Constitution,20 the central issue was the role that the military was
going to play in the direct governing of the country. 21 The debate centered
on the authority of the appointed Senate vis-A-vis the elected House of
Representatives, 22 who would nominate the prime minister, and whether
cabinet members would have to resign from government or military posi-
tions.23 "[T]he military's attempt to dictate a constitution written in
blatantly self-interested terms was thwarted by public opposition that
threatened to spread out of control." 24 The final result, however, still
largely favored extensive military involvement in the governance of
Thailand.25 Consequently, the principal constitutional debating point in the
Spring of 1992 was whether the 1991 Constitution, which permitted a non-
19 MAISRIKROD, supra note 13, at 40-49; Maisrikrod, Thailand 1992, supra note 13, at 336; Rodney
Tasker, Services Rendered, FAR E. ECON. REV., Oct. 1, 1992, at 10-11; see also Rodney Tasker, Ascent of
Angels, FAR E. ECON. REV., sept. 24, 1992, at 12-13; Rodney Tasker, Polishing the Cabinet, FAR E. ECON.
REV., Oct. 8, 1992, at 16, 18. For an account of the early months of the Chuan regime see Maisrikrod,
Thailand 1992, supra note 13, at 338-42.
20 Regarding the drafting of the 1991 Constitution see infra text accompanying notes 87-104.
21 The struggle between military and civilian authority in Thailand is the theme of Chai-anan
Samudavanija & Suchit Bunbongkam, Thailand, in MILITARY-CIVILIAN RELATIONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
78 (Zakaria Haji Ahmad & Harold Crouch eds., 1985) [hereinafterSamudavanija & Bunbongkarn]. They
conclude that:
[Tihe political supremacy of the military has been an outstanding feature in the modem Thai
political system since 1932. An absence of strong participatory political institutions and a lack
of legitimacy on the part of civilian regimes enable the politicized military to seize power and
establish an authoritarian regime without much difficulty. Its organizational complexity and
adaptability, prestige, wealth, and control of the mass media are important political resources for
control over all other political institutions, including the cabinet, the National Assembly and, to
a lesser extent, political parties.
Id at 114
22 It has been observed that: "The most important aspect of a Thai constitution is not the provision
and protection of civil and political liberties, but the extent to which it allows the elected House of
Representatives to participate in the political process." Samudavanija, supra note 4, at 321.
23 A review of the contentious constitutional issues that arose during the drafting" of the 1991
Constitution is provided by Neher, supra note 3, at 598-99; Bunbongkam, supra note 5, at 136-37;
Bhuchongkul, supra note 5, at 319-21.
24 Neher, supra note 3, at 599. See generally Rodney Tasker, Tactical Compromise, FAR E. ECON.
REV., Dec. 5, 1991, at 13; Rodney Tasker, General's Charter, FAR E. ECON. REV., Dec. 19, 1991, at 15-16;
Banyat Tasaneeyavej, Powerful Given Lesson by Charter Protest, BANGKOK POST WKLY. REV., Dec. 20,
1991, at 8.
25 MAISRIKROD, supra note 13, at 20-21.
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elected person to become prime minister,26 should be amended to require
the prime minister to come from the elected House of Representatives. 27
Such an amendment was approved following the bloodshed of May 1992.28
The intense recent debate about the contents of the 1991 Constitution
and the number of constitutions that litter the last six decades of Thai
history highlight the importance of "documentary constitutionalism" in
Thailand. In other words, Thais have accepted the idea that there should
exist a single document expressing the formal law on the structures, princi-
ples and powers of government and the rights and duties of citizens. 29
Constitutions in Thailand, however, have not normally provided neutral
rules to regulate participation and competition among political groups;
rather they have been major tools in maintaining the power of those who
write them.30 Most political commentators have accepted the notion that
the role of a constitution in Thailand has been to legitimate the authority
exercised by the then-dominant political forces.31 One commentator has
observed:
[A] new one [constitution] has been written and issued each
time a shift in political dominance has taken place and with the
primary purpose of protecting the new regime coming into
power. Each ruling group has striven to consolidate its posi-
tion and in so doing has changed the rules of the game and
published a new constitution. 32
Thus, as political forces shift, constitutions have been revoked and rewritten
to reflect the new political balance.
26 Hence, Suchinda's ascent to the prime ministership was constitutionally proper.
27 See Paul Handley, An Uneasy Calm, FAR E. ECON. REv., May 21, 1992, at 10-11; Party Perfidy
Threatens Uneasy Protest Truce, BANGKOK POST WKLY. REV., May 22, 1992, at 1-2; MAISRIKROD, supra
note 13, at 30-31, 34.
28 Amendment of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand No. 4 (Int'l Translations Office
trans., Thail., Sept. 10, 1992) (Thai version in 109 RAADCHAKIDJAA [ROYAL THAI GOV'T GAZEIrE] pt. 95(1992)). See Neher, supra note 3, at 604; Amendments Sail Through 2 Readings, BANGKOK POST WKLY.
REv., June 5, 1992, at 3 [hereinafter Amendments Sail Through 2 Readings]. However, the amendment
only came into force following the September 1992 election.
29 Lawrence W. Beer, Introduction: Constitutionalism in Asia and the United States, in
CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEMS IN LATE TWENTIETH CENTURY ASIA 10-11 (Lawrence W. Beer ed., 1992)
[hereinafter Beer].
30 Samudavanija, supra note 4, at 320.
31 Id. at 321.
32 MYA SAW SHIN, THE CONSTITUTIONS OF THAILAND 59 (1981) [hereinafter SHIN].
VOL. 3 No. 2
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Given the blatant manipulative purpose of past Thai constitutions, it
is not surprising that Thai constitutions have been referred to as having no
"soul. '33 By this it is meant that the key actors have little regard for the
spirit of constitutional rule as practiced and understood in the West.34 Yet
one insightful analysis suggests that achieving a Westem style of constitu-
tional rule in Thailand is inconsistent with Thailand's social values.35 In
particular, the historic locus of power in Thai society is in its elites and not
in the people as in Westem-style constitutional systems.36 Consequently,
Thai constitutions have been designed to facilitate the rule of elites and not
to act as a constraint on rulers.37 It is this constraint on rulers that can be
viewed as the essence of constitutionalism 38 which has been seen as missing
33 Chantornvong & Chenvidyakarn, supra note 6, at 144.
34 Id. at 144; see also Kramol Tongdhamazhart, The Influence of the U.S. Constitution on the Thai
Constitution, in THE U.S. CONSTITUTION AND THE CONSTITUTIONS OF ASIA 53 (Kenneth W. Thompson ed.,
1988) [hereinafter Tongdhamazhart] (comparing Thai and American constitutional attitudes).
3T Kanok Wongtrangan, Executive Power and Constitutionalism in Thailand, in CONSTITUTIONAL
AND LEGAL SYSTEMS OF ASEAN COuNTItS 287, 309 (Carmelo V. Sison ed., 1990) [hereinafter
Wongtran gan].Wo Id at 290, 304, 309-10. The primary Thai social value this author refers to is the existence within
Thailand of a social structure reliant upon patron-client relationships. Id at 289-90. See infra text accom-
panying notes 71-72. Wongtrangan concludes:
History shows that the Thai monarchy existed uninterrupted for almost seven-hundred years.
Logically, values underlying the system of an absolute monarchy have been deep-rooted in the
political and psycho-social thinking of the people. Present-day Thais, therefore, are inclined to
accept ruling from above and expect the ruler to protect and assist them. This kind of thinking
evidently indicates that the ruling power does not belong to the people (the inferior or the sub-
ordinate) but rather to the King or the elite (the superior).
Id at 290.
The author further suggests "that there exists a conflict between Thai constitutional content and its
social context" Id at 293. Here he makes reference to the constitutional function assigned elected mem-
bers of parliament to protect the public interest versus their social role as intervener in the bureaucracy on
behalf of constituents. The conflict is between the general role and the specific interests. Id. at 291-94.
Finally, Wongtrangan postulates that there exists "the traditional belief that power cannot be divided."
Id at 290. He suggests that Thais are familiar with strong rulers and do not understand or accept the idea
of division of power and consequent checks and balances of authority. Id. at 295, 297. Reliance is placed
on the personal qualities of the rulers in order to avoid abuse of power. See id at 310. The author also
states: "[A]ccording to the patron-client value, they (Thais) tend to think that is the duty of a good ruler to
perform services for the people of his own volition and the people have no right to demand such services."
Id at 293.
37 Samudavanija, supra note 4, at 321. Wongtrangan, supra note 35, at 296-301, indicates that little
constraint is placed on the executive in the exercise of authority. See infra text accompanying notes 113-
77.
38 Beer, supra note 29, at 13-15.
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in Thailand. Hence, the constitutions of Thailand have been viewed as
primarily law-in-books or nominal and not law-in-action or normative. 39
Is the 1991 Constitution of Thailand different than its predecessors?
The inability of the military coup leaders to force the acceptance of a
constitution perpetuating their involvement in the political process 40 is a
clear indication that the 1991 Constitution is indeed different. The Supreme
Court of Thailand's unprecedented decision declaring as unconstitutional a
government order by the coup leaders 4 1 suggests a new attitude towards
constitutionalism. Moreover, the revocation by the elected House of
Representatives of a government decree perceived as interfering with judi-
cial independence 42 provides further evidence of a new view regarding
constitutionalism. Constitutional change is being discussed in Thailand
concerning several of the key institutions and mechanisms of governance,43
suggesting that substantial constitutional reform may only be beginning.
Capitalism-driven, economic success has made Thailand of the 1990s an
economically, socially and politically different country than Thailand of the
1970s,44 thus requiring a different approach to constitutional issues than in
the past. Taken together, what has and is occurring evidences a break from
the traditional approach to Thai constitutions and the creation of new consti-
39 EDWARD MCWHINNEY, CONSTITUTION-MAKING: PRINCIPLES, PROCESS, AND PRACTICE 8-9
(1981) [hereinafter MCWHINNEY]. The law-in-books refers to the positive law as enacted by the legislature
whereas the law-in-action means the actual, de facto practice of the law as influenced by community atti-
tudes and expectations. "This dichotomy between abstract constitutional principle, as drafted, and concrete
governmental application of that principle" is especially marked "in the case of some more recent ventures
in constitution-making where the constitutional charter takes on a politically hortatory, programmatic
character, and reads more in the nature of a statement of ideological principles than a practical blue-print
for government." Id at 9. In such a case, the constitution has a symbolic as opposed to functional quality
and appears to be "designed more for public relations at home or abroad than as a genuinely operational
legal charter. The more rhetorical the formulations in the charter, the more it may appear that the constitu-
tion is intended to be nominal and not normative. .. " Id at 9.
40 See infra text accompanying notes 87-104, particularly the text accompanying notes 95-103.
41 See Nattaya Chetchotiros & Disathat Rojanalak, Assets Seizure Ruling Opens Pandora's Box,
BANGKOK POST, Apr. 2, 1993, at 4 [hereinafter Chetchotiros & Rojanalak, Pandora's Box]; see also infra
text accompanying notes 79-85.
42 See infra text accompanying notes 184-89.
43 Panel Wants Control on Use of Executive Decrees, BANGKOK POST WKLY. REv., Nov. 27, 1992,
at 1; New Look at Axing Senate, BANGKOK POST WKLY. REv., Feb. 12, 1993, at 4 [hereinafter New Look at
Axing Senate]; Battle Shapes up Over Key Charter Changes, BANGKOK POST WKLY. REV., Apr. 23, 1993,
at 4.
44 See generally, eag., Kevin Hewison, Of Regimes, State and Pluralities: Thai Politics Enters the
1990s, in SOUTHEAST ASIA IN THE 1990S 159 (Kevin Hewison et al eds., 1993); CLARK D. NEHER,
SOUTHEAST ASIA IN THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ERA 23-54 (1991).
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tutional traditions 45 including a more popularly acceptable constitutional
framework. The purpose of this article is to highlight the possible emer-
gence of new constitutional traditions by outlining the principal contents of
the 1991 Constitution with a focus on the areas where recent controversy
has existed. It is first useful, however, to comment briefly on the history of
constitutions in Thailand and identify several key constitutional imperatives
that exist irrespective of the written constitution.
II. A BRIEF REVIEW OF THAI CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY
Thailand has a rich constitutional history46 which encompasses the
fifteen documents of the last sixty years and, prior to that, the words and
actions of the forward-looking monarchs of the late 1800s and early 1900s.
This history demonstrates that power has rarely changed hands pursuant to
the dictates of a written constitution. More frequently changes of govern-
ment have come through extra-constitutional means, namely the coup
d'6tat.47 The cycle of Thai politics, of which the coup d'6tat is a part, has
already been noted.48 The principal reason new constitutions were brought
into existence was to legitimate the rule of those usurping power, inevitably
military authorities.49 As has been observed, however: "It is debatable
whether the military really needs a Constitution to provide it with legiti-
macy to rule." 50 Yet, new constitutions are created on a regular basis.
45 Beer makes the point that it is only in the last few decades that autonomous development of con-
stitutional systems has taken place in Asia, the result being that: "Modem constitutional traditions in Asia
have just begun." Beer, supra note 29, at 7.
46 See SHIN, supra note 32; Preben A.F. Aakesson et al., The Development of Constitutionalism in
Thailand: Some Historical Considerations, in CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEMS IN LATE TWENTIETH CENTURY
ASIA 656 (Lawrence W. Beer ed., 1992) [hereinafter Aakesson et al.]. See also Samudavanija, supra note
4, at 305-17; Chantomvong & Chenvidyakarn, supra note 6, at 144-56. Regarding the existence and con-
tent of constitutionalism during the period of the absolute monarchy see Wongtrangan, supra note 35, at
287-89.
47 Commenting on the popularity and acceptance of coups d'dtat in Thailand, Dhiravegin suggests
that coups are a continuation of the traditional Thai political process where conflicts over transfers of
power were common. DHIRAVEGN, supra note 4, at 150. He further suggests that coups are "sanctioned
by Thai socio-religious values." Id at 195.
48 See supra text accompanying note 4.
49 See supra text accompanying notes 30-32.
50 Chantomvong & Chenvidyakam, supra note 6, at 153. Traditional governmental legitimacy in
Thailand arose from the ability of the govemment to perform state ceremonies; to maintain law and order;
and to provide security from external threats. While to this list may now be added support by the elector-
ate, one commentator has indicated that "the legitimacy of government is still measured by its capacity to
perform basic functions." DHIRAVEGIN, supra note 4, at 194-96.
Concerning the military generally in Thailand, Samudavanija and Bunbongkam have written:
"The role of the military as the guardian of national institutions, traditions and virtue has elevated the mili-
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The continual recreation of written constitutions is in part a product
of the 1932 overthrow of the absolute monarchy and its promised replace-
ment with constitutional, democratic government. 51 Having usurped power
to establish constitutional rule, the military has usually seen it as necessary
to create a constitution-based government. 52 The number of constitutions
and the emphasis put on them has created its own momentum for a new
constitution when an old one is suspended. Moreover, a constitutional
document which contains elements familiar to foreign interests can assist a
new government in obtaining international, and even national, acceptance.
This aspect of constitution-making, although not unique to Thailand,53 is
quite familiar there because much of the modem legal system is viewed by
some as having been devised in order to appease, if not please, foreign
interests. 54 For all the above reasons, written constitutions have been an
integral part of Thai political and legal history.
Thailand's constitutional history took a dramatic turn in 1973, when
for the first time, there was a popularly-supported replacement of a military
government by a civilian one.55 Despite the reassertion of military power in
tary profession into a position of high prestige in Thai society." Samudavanija & Bunbongkam, supra note
21, at 11I. Concerning the strength and acceptance of the military in Thailand see generally Samudavanija
& Bunbongkam, supra note 21, at 11-14.
51 Samudavanija & Bunbongkam, supra note 21, at 79. This promise was never kept.
Samudavanija notes: "[li]t is ironical that soon after the success of the Westernized elites in their seizure of
power from the monarchy [in 1932], constitutional idealism gradually eroded into formalistic constitu-
tionalism." Samudavanija, supra note 4, at 307.
52 Chantornvong & Chenvidyakarn, supra note 6, at 143.
53 McWhinney comments that constitution-making in some countries may be "in the nature of a
public relations exercise, designed in considerable measure to impress governments and public opinion in
foreign countries." MCWHINNEY, supra note 39, at 22.
54 Conceming the "modernization" of Thai law in the 1900s and the influence of non-Thais on this
process see 1968 THAILAND OFFICIAL Y.B. 254-258 [hereinafter YEARBOOK]; M.B. HOOKER, A CONCISE
LEGAL HISTORY OF SOUTH-EAST ASIA 183-85 (1978); Preedee Kasemsup, Reception of Law in Thailand -
A Buddhist Society, in ASIAN INDIGENOUS LAW 267 (Masaji Chiba ed., 1986). See generally APIRAT
PETCHSIRI, EASTERN IMPORTATION OF WESTERN CRIMINAL LAW: THAILAND AS A CASE STUDY (1987).
Petchsiri comments:
Although no conclusive evidence is available to show why Thailand embraced the Western
system, two major reasons emerge as apparent basic causes of this change. First, voluntary
adoption preserved national autonomy and evaded colonial powers and their claims of extraterri-
torial jurisdiction. Second, Westernization would help Thailand reach developmental goals such
as industrialization, national unification, and social welfare.
Id at 10. The former reason is inevitably given more weight than the latter.
55 See JOSEPH J. WRIGHT, JR., THE BALANCING ACT: A HISTORY OF MODERN THAILAND 197-211
(1991) [hereinafter WRIGHT]. On the 1973 revolution and the 1976 coup see generally DAVID MORELL &
CHAI-ANAN SAMUDAVANIJA, POLITICAL CONFLICT IN THAILAND: REFORM, REACTION AND REVOLUTION
(1981); DHIRAVEGIN, supra note 4, at 173-208. All political and social histories of Thailand contain an ex-
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1976,56 the consequence of the political events of 1973, has been that the
military has no longer been able to make the Thai public accept a constitu-
tion nakedly designed to assure the military dominant power and restrict the
participation of other social forces.57 This outcome is clearly evidenced by
the 1978 Constitution which deliberately set out to create power-sharing
among competing forces 58 and by the failure of the attempt made by the
military in 1991, to create a constitution exclusively to their liking.59 Thus,
the political aspects of the written constitutions of Thailand are increasingly
subject to pressures outside the control of the dominant political force,
representing the major shift that has taken place in sixty years of Thai
constitutional history.
Given the transitory nature of Thai constitutional documents, it is rea-
sonable to suggest that there are a number of 'constitutional imperatives'
explicitly or implicitly existing within Thailand that are as important, or
even more important, than the written constitutions. 60 By their very nature,
constitutional imperatives are flexible and not legally enforceable. Their
tensive commentary on the events of 1973. See, e.g., JOHN L.S. GIRLING, THAILAND: SOCIETY AND
POLITICS (1981) [hereinafter GIRLING]; CHARLES F. KEYES, THAILAND: BUDDHIST KINGDOM AS MODERN
NATON-STATE (1989) [hereinafter KEYES].
56 See WRIGHT, supra note 55, at 243-61. See generally sources cited supra note 55.
57 Chantornvong & Chenvidyakarn, supra note 6, at 153; Neher, supra note 3, at 592.
58 See Chantornvong & Chenvidyakarn, supra note 6, at 156. Dhiravegin refers to the 1978
Constitution as having created "halfway democracy" as the Constitution sought to blend the newly
emerged social forces with the entrenched civil and military bureaucrats. DHIRAVEGIN, supra note 4, at
209. Commenting on the objectives of the 1978 Constitution, one of the participants in the drafting stated
that there were two objectives: legitimizing military participation in the political process and regulating
political structures to support democratic development. Tongdhamazhart, supra note 34, at 56.
59 See infra text accompanying notes 87-104.
60 While not referring to constitutional imperatives as such, SHIN has commented:
[W]lfile written constitutions may not be venerated in Thailand in themselves, this constitu-
tional instability is in certain respects more apparent than real. Thailand, in addition to the
written constitution which is in force at any given time, may be said also to have substantial
structure of law and custom as the basis upon which the government rests.
SHIN, supra note 34, at 61.
Section 30, para. I of the 1991 Interim Constitution makes explicit reference to "constitutional prac-
tices of Thailand." Section 30, para. I reads: "Whenever no provision of this Constitution is applicable to
any case, it shall be decided in accordance with the constitutional practices of Thailand under the demo-
cratic form of government." RADTHATHAMMANOON [Constitution] (B.E. 2534, Mar. 1, 1991) § 30, para.
I.
These constitutional imperatives are not unlike constitutional conventions which exist in countries
which derive their constitutional heritage from the United Kingdom. Concerning constitutional conven-
tions see generally GEOFFREY MARSHALL, CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS: THE RULES AND FORMS OF
POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY (1986); ANDREW HEARD, CANADIAN CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS
(1991).
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authority is derived from the willingness of the population and power-
holders to accept and abide by them.
The primary constitutional imperative in Thailand is the unquestioned
position of the current Monarch, King Bhumibol, as the Head of State.61
This position is regularly affirmed in the written constitutions.62 However,
the King's authority goes beyond the ceremonial role of a constitutional
monarch and the role assigned the Monarch by the formal constitution. "It
has been overwhelmingly accepted, especially since 1973, that the king
remains the final arbiter of a national crisis. The social stability of
Thailand, despite its periodic coups d'6tat, can be explained by the
existence and positive role of the monarchy." 63 Hence, the King's approval
was sought for the 1991 Interim Constitution,64 and all the major protago-
nists accepted His intervention in the Spring of 1992.65 The full extent of
the King's authority is unclear, but His constitutional position representing
the interests of the general Thai population is increasingly accepted. King
Bhumibol is clearly one of the pillars of the Thai constitution, irrespective
of the content of the written constitution.66
A second constitutional imperative concerns the relationship between
the governing and the governed, and it directs that the dominant political
force will not exercise its authority to unduly repress the freedoms of the
Thai people. Historically, there is little experience in Thailand of wide-
scale social, economic, religious or political repression,67 even in times of
dictatorial, military rule.68
61 Not surprisingly following the 1932 overthrow of the absolute monarchy, the significance of the
Royalty was minimized. During the regime of military strong-man Sarit Thanarat, the Kingship was revi-
talized as a way of establishing legitimacy for the military government. See Chantomvong &
Chenvidyakam, supra note 6, at 151. They conclude: "In the end the monarchy has come to exercise a
much more important role in Thai politics than the military leaders originally had planned for." Id The
military's espousal of their close connection with the Monarch has given King Bhumibol a degree of lever-
age over the military.
62 See RADTHATHAMMANOON [Constitution] (B.E. 2534, Dec. 9, 1991) § 3. See generally id
chapter 2, §§ 6-23. The historic position of the Monarch vis-i-vis the Thai people and in the written con-
stitutions is summarized in SHIN, supra note 32, at 16-30.
63 Samudavanija, supra note 4, at 337-38.
64 See Rodney Tasker, Post-coup Worries, FAR E. ECON. REV., Mar. 14, 1991, at 13.
65 King Bhumibol's intervention in the Spring 1992 crisis has been referred to above. See supra
note 17.
66 The constitutional imperative associated with the Thai Monarch is related to King Bhumibol and
not the institution of the Monarchy. Hence, a successor may not have anywhere near the same importance
in Thai constitutional activity.
67 A number of exceptions to this bold statement exist, the most obvious being the position of
women in Thai society. See generally Darunee Tantiwiramanond & Shashi Pandey, The Status andRole of
Thai Women in the Pre-Modern Period: A Historical and Cultural Perspective, 2 SOJOURN: SOCIAL
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It should be pointed out that Thai authoritarianism is not
very repressive. Authoritarian regimes that attempted to be too
repressive usually met with strong opposition from various
sections of society....
The existence of countervailing forces such as an inde-
pendent judiciary, a free press, and some favourable social
conditions such as relatively little class antagonism or ethnic or
religious cleavage, are necessary but not sufficient conditions
for a viable democracy in Thailand. These conditions do serve
as important factors in preventing an authoritarian regime from
becoming extreme in its rule.69
While Thais respect political power,70 they do not value political power
exercised indiscriminately as this would be both inconsistent with the
patron-client heritage in Thai society and with socio-cultural norms regard-
ing individualism. The patron-client heritage directs that while clients will
respect and obey a patron, the patron will not make unreasonable demands
on the client and will assist the client materially or otherwise.71 The power-
ful (patron) will only receive respect, status and obedience where the power
exercised is not unreasonable or arbitrary. Moreover, one of the most
prevalent socio-cultural norms in Thailand is individualism and its associ-
ISSUES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 125 (1987); VITIT MUNTARBHORN, WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT IN THAILAND 43-
61 (1985); KOBKuN RAYANAKORN, WOMEN AND THE LAW IN THAILAND AND CANADA (1990).
68 The Sarit regime, from 1958-63, was unquestionably one of absolute rule with little tolerance for
political dissent. Yet, the regime did not exercise its authority totally arbitrarily and did seem to have as a
goal the enhancing of the economic condition of the citizenry. Sarit was viewed as a benevolent patriar-
chal ruler and "was accepted by the general population." See DHIRAVEGIN, supra note 4, at 159-65.
69 Samudavanija, supra note 4, at 337.
70 Dhiravegin comments: "The exercise of power is seen as being more effective than going through
a long process of bargaining." DHIRAVEGIN, supra note 4, at 151. He goes on to note that: "Power is not
used as an ultima ratio but as part of the process of getting things done." Id See also Wongtrangan, supra
note 35.
71 Concerning the patron-client explanation and experience in Thai society see Akin Rabibhadana,
Clientship and Class Structure in the Early Bangkok Period, in CHANGE AND PERSISTENCE IN THAI
SOCIETY 93 (G. William Skinner & A. Thomas Kirsch eds., 1975); Lucien Hanks, The Thai Social Order
as Entourage and Circle, in CHANGE AND PERSISTENCE IN THAI SOCIETY 197 (G. William Skinner & A.
Thomas Kirsch eds., 1975); Barend J. Terwiel, Formal Structure and Informal Rules: An Historical
Perspective on Hierarchy, Bondage and the Patron-Client Relationship, in STRATEGIES AND STRUCTURES
IN THAI SOCIETY 19 (Han ten Brummelhuis & Jeremy H. Kemp eds., 1984). The patron-client or entou-
rage explanation of Thai society is concisely presented in DAVID M. ENGEL, CODE AND CUSTOM IN A THAI
PROVINCIAL COURT 69-73 (1978) [hereinafter ENGEL].
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ated tolerance for non-conforming behavior.72 Equally important is the
desire to avoid conflict situations.73 Together these socio-cultural norms
reinforce a tolerance for a degree of non-conformity and an unwillingness to
accept interference with the Thai population's freedoms. Reasonable
dissent, freedom of the press, 74 freedom of religion,75 economic freedom
and social freedoms, many of which existed to some degree prior to formal
constitutional government, 76 have generally been respected irrespective of a
written constitution and appear to be widely accepted despite occasional
violations. Political and labor freedoms, however, have been less widely
recognized than these others.77
72 See John F. Embree, Thailand - A Loosely Structured Social System, 52 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 3
(1950). Engel comments: "Most observers of traditional Thai society have been impressed with the rela-
tive weakness of organizational units that are prominent in other societies: caste, community groups, and
even kinship. Individualism is mentioned again and again as an outstanding trait among Thai people .... "
ENGEL, supra note 71, at 69. See also Han ten Brummelhuis, Abundance and Avoidance: An
Interpretation of Thai Individualism, in STRATEGIES AND STRUCTURES IN THAI SOCIETY 39 (Han ten
Brummelhuis & Jeremy H. Kemp eds. 1984).
73 One insightful observer has commented: "The Thai cultural bias is to avoid conflict and social
confrontation. Thus, conflict resolution often takes the form of arbitration and compromise and voluntary
restitution of wrongs based on the wise counsel of elders, be they monks, headmen, spirit doctors, or
respected family and clan heads." William J. Klausner, Law and Society, 3 CHULALONGKORN L. REV. 1, 7(198. Concerning mediation in legal disputes see ENGEL, supra note 71, at 75-99.
It is generally acknowledged that Thailand has the freest print media in Southeast Asia. See
generally Pira Chirasopone, Thailand, in PRESS SYSTEMS IN ASEAN STATES 91 (Achal Mehra ed., 1989).
While the print media has been beyond direct government control for some time, the broadcast media has
been directly government controlled. This state of affairs is now in the process of being changed. See New
Television Licences Herald Era of Access, BANGKOK POST WKLY. REV., Aug. 7, 1992, at 3; Cabinet
Agrees to Overhaul Broadcasting Control Body, BANGKOK POST WKLY. REV., Sept. 4, 1992, at 20.
The attempt by the military to censor the print media in the Spring of 1992, was largely unsuccessful.
MAISRIKROD, supra note 13, at 29, 53-54, Paul Handley, Press and Pirates, FAR E. ECON. REV., June 11,
1992, at 10-11.
75 The state religion in Thailand is Buddhism with the government involved in the Sangha, or order
of Buddhist monks. See PETER A. JACKSON, BUDDHISM, LEGITIMATION, AND CONFLICT 63-93 (1989)
[hereinafter JACKSON]. For an interesting and provocative assessment of the relationship between the Thai
state and Buddhism see Jim Taylor, Buddhist Revitalization, Modernization, and Social Change in
Contemporary Thailand, 8 SOJOURN: SOCIAL ISSUES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 62 (1993). However, acceptance
of other religions has deep roots in Thailand and there exists a substantial Muslim population in Southern
Thailand. See KEYES, supra note 55, at 126-35.
Within the state-supported Sangha, there have been issues of defrocking and excommunication. See
Cholthira Satyawadhna, The Defrocking of Phra Bodhiraksa. A Case Study of Human Rights Violations in
Thailand, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION 75-91 (John Girling ed., 1991); see also
JACKSON, supra , at 159-98. Generally concerning religious freedom in Thailand in its legal context, see
Aakesson et al., supra note 46, at 674-75.
76 Concerning the abolition of slavery, the right to a fair and speedy trial, the right to legal aid, the
right to free speech, the right to education, and the right of protection from the acts of corrupt officials see
Aakesson et al., supra note 46, at 670-79.
77 Labor unions have been a frequent target of military repression. Following the February 1991
coup, the military junta announced its intent to remove the legal recognition of state enterprise unions.
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While not a constitutional imperative, mention must be made of a
constitutional practice which has existed because of the extra-constitutional
means by which power has so frequently changed hands in Thailand.
Courts and subsequent governments have accepted the notion that regard-
less of the illegality of the acquisition of authority, once in an unquestioned
position of power, legislative action taken by the usurping authority is
legally effective.78 This practice prevents having to re-enact laws made
prior to a new constitution coming into force, and moreover, it is a prag-
matic recognition of political reality unencumbered by legal formalism.
Indeed, the 1991 Constitution specifically directs that laws, notifications
and orders issued under the Interim Constitution are valid under the 1991
Constitution.79 To a constitutional purist, however, such a practice consti-
tutes the recognition of the legitimacy of the illegal means of acquiring
power and the acceptance of the primacy of might over constitutional prin-
cipLles.
This pragmatic practice has been shaken by the March 1993, ruling of
the Thai Supreme Court that an order issued by the National Peace-Keeping
Council (the coup leaders) in February 1991,80 was inconsistent with Thai
Rodney Tasker, Ready and Waiting, FAR E. ECON. REV., Mar. 28, 1991, at 9 [hereinafter Tasker, Ready
and Waiting]. Reportedly, this move by the military junta was viewed with favor in Thailand. Despite
promises by the civilian. government to restore the union rights of state enterprise employees, there has
been reticence and delay on this issue. See Gordon Fairclough, Back to Work, FAR E. ECON. REv., Nov. 5,
1992, at 21-22. See generally Kelly A. Doelman, Thailand's State Enterprise Labor Relations Act:
Denying Public Employees the Right of Association and the Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively, 2
PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 63 (1993).
78 Viboon Engkagul, Recognition of Human Rights Under Thai Laws, in AcCESS TO JUSTICE: THE
STRUGGLE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 99 (Harry M. Scoble & Laurie S. Wiseberg eds.,
1985). Engkagul comments:
Contemporary Thai jurisprudence has now recognized the legitimacy of the military
mechanisms which have toppled previous lawful governments. According to the precedent
established by the present Supreme Court of Thailand, the (military) leader of any coup d'dtat
who successfully takes over power from the lawful government is deemed the supreme ruler of
the government. Therefore, any decrees or commands issued by him during his rule are now
regarded as of equal status to the lawful actions of the Parliament. In the past 50 years in
Thailand there have been numerous successful coups and revolutions, yet all legislation enacted
by means of revolutionary decrees are considered valid laws. There is no doubt that almost all
of these decrees, etc. were enacted in contradiction to the ideology of human rights; none the
less, in the context of the current Thai Constitution, all are regarded as valid, as integral parts of
'the provisions of the laws.'
Id
79 RADTHATHAMMANOON [Constitution] (B.E. 2534, Dec. 9, 1991) §§ 222-223.
80 Announcement of the National Peace-Keeping Council No. 26, Re: Attachment and Freezing of
Property (Bangkok Bus. & Secretarial Office Limited trans., Feb. 25, 1991) (Thai version in 109
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constitutional practices.Sl The Supreme Court did not strike down the
offending law because of the illegality of the seizure of power; rather they
found the law to be inconsistent with the relevant provisions of the 1991
Interim Constitution.8 2 The Court rejected the argument that Section 32 of
the Interim Constitution, which provided that all orders of the National
Peace-Keeping Council were legally valid, insulated the order from consti-
tutional attack.83  The Court's holding regarding unconstitutionality,
however, was a narrow one, and it was only the particular nature of the facts
which gave the Court the jurisdiction to examine the relevant order.84
Moreover, there is uncertainty over the legality of the Supreme Court's
jurisdiction to pronounce on the constitutionality of laws.8 5 These elements
of the case raise doubts about both its potential use in challenging other
orders issued by the coup-leaders86 and its wider implications for Thai
RAADCHAKIDJAA [Royal Thai Gov't Gazette] pt. 34 (Special Issue, 1991)) [hereinafter NPKC Order No.
26]. The effect of this order was to freeze the assets of members of the civilian government whom it was
felt had become unusually rich through corrupt practices. A seven member Property Examination
Committee was established to evaluate whether property had been improperly acquired. See generally
Bhuchongkul, supra note 5, at 321-22.
81 For a discussion of the details of the decision see Chetchotiros & Rojanalak, Pandora's Box,
supra note 41, at 4.
82 The Supreme Court determined that the Property Examination Committee established by NPKC
Order No. 26 exercised a judicial function that was reserved by §§ 3, 29 of the Interim Constitution for the
Courts and hence that the establishment and actions of the Property Examination Committee were un-
constitutional. Id.
83 About this aspect of the decision Chetchotiros & Rojanalak comment: "In fact, the Supreme
Court in the past had upheld the legality of all orders issued by coupmakers and until last week, this line of
traditional interpretation on constitutionality of such orders [§ 32 of the Interim Constitution] had been
prevailing." Id.
84 NPKC Order No. 26, supra note 80, was amended in late 1991, to allow for a review of a finding
of the Property Examination Committee by the entire Supreme Court of Thailand, thus by-passing the
lower courts. The curious political circumstances of this amendment are noted by Bhuchongkul, supra
note 5, at 322. In late 1991, and early 1992, the Property Examination Committee found that ten individu-
als had acquired assets in an improper manner. These individuals appealed to the Supreme Court to review
and reverse the findings.
85 Section 206, para. I of the 1991 Constitution reserves to the Constitutional Tribunal the exclusivejurisdiction to pronounce on the constitutionality of government action. RADTHATHAMMANOON
[Constitution) (B.E. 2534, Dec. 9, 1991) § 206, para. 1. See infra text accompanying notes 190-95.
However, the 1991 Interim Constitution did not establish a Constitutional Tribunal. Section 31 left the
question of constitutionality of law or action to be decided by the appointed National Legislative
Assembly. RADTHATHAMMANOON [Constitution] (B.E. 2534, Mar. 1, 1991) § 31.
The Thai Supreme Court decided that NPKC Order No. 26 had to be assessed pursuant to the 1991
Interim Constitution and that since by 1992 the appointed National Legislative Assembly no longer existed,
the issue of constitutionality fell to be determined by the Supreme Court. Moreover, "the Supreme Courtjudges referred to general legal principles under which the courts have the authority to decide if any par-
ticular laws are constitutional or not in relation to cases under deliberation." Chetchotiros & Rojanalak,
Pandora's Box, supra note 41, at 4..
86 See Chetchotiros & Rojanalak, Pandora's Box, supra note 41, at 4.
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constitutional practices. Thus, the decision is either a bold step toward
undermining the legitimacy conferred upon coup-leaders by Thai practices
or an anomaly that will be ignored as being inconsistent with the pragma-
tism necessary to maintain a coherent legal system faced with abrupt, illegal
changes of government.
III. DRAFTING THE 1991 CONSTITUTION
In exploring national experiences in constitution-making, one author-
ity noted the following "options as to arenas for constitutional drafting and
enactment:" 1) the expert commission; 2) parliamentary enactment; 3)
executive diplomacy; 4) constituent assembly; 5) popular initiative; and 6)
the popular referendum to legitimate the new or revised constitution.87 The
experience of Thailand in 1991, arguably involved the employment of an
expert commission, parliamentary (a non-elected one) enactment, assent of
the executive and to a limited extent, popular opinion. The involvement of
the commission, the parliament and the executive (the King) were set out in
the 1991 Interim Constitution.88 The participation of the general public was
not provided for in the constitutional drafting process, but rather it arose
spontaneously as a reaction to the direction the constitution was going in the
formal process.
One of the tasks of the appointed National Legislative Assembly
(NLA), established pursuant to the 1991 Interim Constitution, was the
drafting of a new constitution.8 9 The Interim Constitution directed the NLA
to appoint a twenty-person committee charged with the task of drafting a
new constitution. 90 The NLA was then to consider the work of the Drafting
Committee in three readings with the final reading requiring a roll call vote
and a two-thirds majority in favor for the constitution to be adopted.91
When the constitution received the necessary approval, it was to be pre-
sented to the King for signature before its promulgation as the new
Constitution.92 If the NLA failed to approve the proposed constitution at
the third reading, the NLA was to try and draft a new constitution that
87 MCWHINNEY, supra note 39, at 27-41.
88 RADTHATHAMMANOON [Constitution] (B.E. 2534, Mar. 1, 1991) §§ 10-1I.
89 Id § 6, para. 1.
90 Id § 10, para. 1. Members of the committee were not required to be members of the NLA. Id §
10, para. 2.
91 Id § 11, paras. 1-2.
92 Id. § 11, para. 3.
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would obtain sufficient support. 93 If, after two attempts, the NLA could not
muster a two-thirds vote in favor of a constitution, the NLA was to be
terminated and the cabinet and National Peace-Keeping Council94 were to
sit jointly to complete, revise or redraft the constitution and submit it to the
King.95 While the above process was followed, there were a few unex-
pected twists along the way.
A month after the February 1991 coup, 292 people were appointed to
the NLA by the King pursuant to the advice of the National Peace-Keeping
Council. 96 Over half were active or former military personnel, and of the
civilians, "there were few figures likely to stand in the way of the
military. 97 The twenty-person Drafting Committee started work in May
and presented the product of its labors to the NLA in August.98 Although
the NLA overwhelmingly supported the proposed constitution at its first
reading in late August, they departed from the process set out in the Interim
Constitution by establishing a twenty-five person Scrutiny Committee to
review the proposed constitution.99 The Scrutiny Committee, announcing
completion of its work in mid-November, recommended revisions of
several key aspects of the proposed constitution.100 In response to the work
93 Id § 12.
94 The National Peace-Keeping Council (NPKC), consisting of the February 1991 coup leaders, was
established by § 18 of the 1991 Interim Constitution. Id. § 18.
95 Id § 13, para. 1.
96 Id § 7, para. I.
97 Tasker, Ready and Waiting, supra note 77, at 8. The composition of the NLA met with criticism
from political analysts, the media, and numerous politicians. Id See also Military Dominates Legislative
Assembly, BANGKOK POST WKLY. REV., Mar. 29, 1991, at 1.
98 For a review of the contents of the constitutional document completed by the Drafting Committee
and some of the criticisms made of the document see Banyat Tasaneeyavej, Charter Draft Attacked as
Political 'Time Bomb', BANGKOK POST WKLY. REv., Aug. 9, 1991, at 8 [hereinafter Tasaneeyavej]. In the
opinion of one observer, the Committee had "enjoyed an unexpected freedom in drafting, as the NPKC
refrained from imposing definite guidelines." Bunbongkam, supra note 5, at 136.
99 Draft Constitution Wins Easy Approval, BANGKOK POST WKLY REV., Sept. 6, 1991, at 3. The
Scrutiny Committee was composed of eight senior military officers and other members known to have
close connections with the National Peace-Keeping Council (NPKC). See Sermsuk Kasitipradit, Power
Play on the Charter Chessboard, BANGKOK POST WKLY. REV., Sept. 13, 1991, at 8 [hereinafter
Kasitipradit, Power Play]; Rodney Tasker, The Power Game, FAR E. ECON. REV., Sept. 19, 1991, at 12[hereinafter Tasker, Power Game]. Asked about the allegation of closeness of most of the members of the
Scrutiny Committee and the NPKC, the chair is reported to have responded that he did not know what the
NPKC was an abbreviation for! Constitutional Review Likely to Take 3-6 Months, BANGKOK POST WKLY.
REV., Set. 13, 1991, at4.
10 The recommended revisions are noted in Bhuchongkul, supra note 5, at 319-20; Panel Unveils
Controversial Draft Charter, BANGKOK POST WKLY. REV., Nov. 22, 1991, at I [hereinafter Panel Unveils
Controversial Draft Charter].
Commenting on the revisions made by the Scrutiny Committee, a newspaper editorial stated: "[T]he
revised draft charter has made the original draft drawn up by the NPKC-appointed Constitution Drafting
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of the Scrutiny Committee and while the NLA passed the constitution
through the second reading, the public became directly involved in the
process, staging massive protests against the proposed constitution. 0 1 The
key points of contention were the ability of government and military
officials to be in the cabinet and the authority of the appointed Senate to
have an equal voice with the elected House of Representatives in
nominating the prime minister and voting to replace a sitting government.
102
The Scrutiny Committee withdrew several of their amendments, and the
NLA hastily made further changes in the face of the criticism.103 In another
unexpected move, King Bhumibol called for compromise, stating that if the
draft constitution proved unacceptable in practice it could be amended.1 04
Following this intervention, the proposed constitution passed the third and
final reading by the NLA, and the King approved it as the new Constitution
of Thailand.
IV. THE 1991 THAI CONSTITUTION
Considering Thailand's extensive experience with written
constitutions, it is not surprising that the 1991 model has striking facial
similarities to its predecessors. The Chair of the Constitutional Drafting
Committee stated that they used the 1978 Constitution as the basis for
deliberations. 105 The 1991 and 1978 constitutions are similarly structured
with eleven chapters and a set of transitory provisions; the title and
arrangements of the chapters are virtually the same; and a large percentage
Committee and criticized for containing some undemocratic provisions... look like a liberal and demo-
cratic one.' Democracy Put Back to a Distant Future, BANGKOK POST WKLY. REV., Nov. 22, 1991, at 8.
101 Massive Protest Against Draft Charter, BANGKOK POST WKLY. REV., Nov. 29, 1991, at 1
[hereinafter Massive Protest]; Anti-charter Rally Attracts 50,000, BANGKOK POST WKLY. REV., Nov. 29,
1991, at 20; Rodney Tasker, Tactical Compromise, FAR E. ECON. REV., Dec. 5, 1991, at 13 [hereinafter
Tasker, Tactical Compromise]. It was during these protests that General Suchinda announced that he
would not accept the Prime Ministership under the new constitution.
102 Massive Protest, supra note 101, at i; Bunbongkam, supra note 5, at 137; Bhuchongkul, supra
note 5, at 320-21.
103 Tasker, Tactical Compromise, supra note 101, at 13; Charter Crisis Defused, BANGKOK POST
WKLY. REV., Dec. 6, 1991, at 1; see also Massive Protest, supra note 101, at 1; Panel Unveils
Controversial Draft Charter, supra note 100, at 1; Bunbongkam, supra note 5, at 136-37; Bhuchongkul,
supra note 5, at 320-21.
104 The King Calls for Compromise on Charter, BANGKOK POST WKLY. REV., Dec. 13, 1991, at 1;
Rodney Tasker, General's Charter, FAR E. ECON. REV., Dec. 19, 1991, at 15, 16; Banyat Tasaneeyavej,Powerful Given Lesson by Charter Protest, BANGKOK POST WKLY. REV., Dec. 20, 1991, at 8.
105 Charter Not Written with Bias: Minister, BANGKOK POST WKLY. REV., May 10, 1991, at 4.
FEB. 1995
PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL
of the provisions of the 1978 document have been incorporated with
minimal change into the 1991 Constitution.
One difference between the 1978 and 1991 documents is in Chapter
Eleven, Amending the Constitution. Amending the 1978 Thai Constitution
involved the passage of the revisions by a majority vote of the Senate and
House of Representatives sitting in joint session. 106 This requirement has
been retained in the 1991 Constitution.107 The distinguishing feature of the
amending process in the 1991 Constitution is that not only can the Council
of Ministers or one-third of the members of the House of Representatives
commence the process, as was the case in the 1978 Constitution,108 but now
one-third of the full membership of the House of Representatives and
Senate can also start the process.109 This provision gives the Senate a
possible avenue for commencing constitutional change which did not
previously exist. 1 0 Despite the apparent ease of operation of the amending
process under the 1978 Constitution, only two amendments were made to
the 1978 Constitution.I' Within a few months of completion of the 1991
Constitution and following the bloodshed and violence of May 1992,
however, four constitutional amendments were quickly made in order to
assist resolution of the unrest.1 12
106 See RADTHATHAMMANOON [Constitution] (B.E. 2521, Dec. 22, 1978) § 194(2)-(6); see also
Tongdhamazhart, supra note 34, at 60.
107 RADTHATHAMMANOON [Constitution] (B.E. 2534, Dec. 9, 1991) § 21](2)-(6).
108 RADTHATHAMMANOON [Constitution] (B.E. 2521, Dec. 22, 1978) § 194(1).
109 RADTHATHAMMANOON [Constitution] (B.E. 2534, Dec. 9, 1991) § 211(1).
110 Assuming that the appointed Senate is military-dominated, the new proactive role in constitu-
tional amendments can be criticized as being undemocratic and permitting the possibility of further
constitutional manipulation. It can also be argued that the ability to institute constitutional change may
work to allow adaptation of the existing constitutional framework to new political realities without the
necessity to suspend or revoke the 1991 Constitution.
111 Amendment of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand (Int'l Translations Office, Thail.,
Aug. 14, 1985) (Thai version in 102 RAADCHAKIDJAA [ROYAL THAI GOV'T GAZETTE] pt. 105 (1985));
Amendment of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand No. 2 (Int'l Translations Office, Thail. Aug.
24, 1989) (Thai version in 106 RAADCHAKIDJAA [ROYAL THAI GOV'T GAZETTE] pt. 142 (1989)). Noted in
Tasaneeyavej, supra note 98, at 8. Several proposed amendments did not receive sufficient support.
Chantomvong & Chenvidyakam, supra note 6, at 162. The most spectacular failed constitutional amend-
ment was the one proposed by the military in 1983 designed to continue the provision in the transition
section of the 1978 Constitution, § 205, which allowed a person to simultaneously be a Minister and a
govemment or military official. Noted in Chantomvong & Chenvidyakam, supra note 6, at 161-62. For a
detailed description see PISAN SURIYAMONGKOL, INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL
PROCESSES IN THAILAND 46-56 (1988).
112 Amendment of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand, Nos. 1-3 (Int'l Translations
Office, Thail., June 29, 1992) (Thai version in 109 RAADCHAKIDJAA [ROYAL THAI GOv'T GAZETTE] pt. 72(1992)); Amendment of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand No. 4 (Int'l Translations Office
trans., Thail., Sept. 10 1992). See generally Neher, supra note 3, at 604; MAISRIKROD, supra note 13, at
34; Amendments Sail Through 2 Readings, supra note 28, at 3.
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A. The Balance of Power
As between the American constitutional model of a strict division
between the legislative and executive levels of government and the British
model of the executive being drawn from and directly responsible to the
legislature, the 1991 Thai Constitution follows its 1978 predecessor in
siding with the British model, albeit with variations.' 13 Pressure had existed
to adopt the full separation of powers approach; it being argued that
prohibiting legislators from being in the cabinet (Council of Ministers)
would reduce vote-buying, a perceived prevalent practice in Thai
elections.114 This view was considered but rejectedl' 5 in favor of the
system now in the 1991 Constitution which stipulates that ministers can be,
but are not required to be, from the elected House of Representatives and
that the ministers are responsible to the Parliament (House of
Representatives and Senate).116
1. The Council of Ministers
The executive level of government in Thailand, the Council of
Ministers set out in Chapter Seven of the 1991 Constitution, is the most
powerful of the traditional three levels of government - executive,
legislative, judicial. Contributing to the power of the executive vis-A-vis the
legislative branch has been the discontinuity of parliaments over the last
few decades.117
Although not required by the 1991 Constitution, an amendment made
in 1992, following the silent coup by General Suchinda and subsequent
disturbances, requires that the prime minister be a member of the elected
113 For a brief discussion of the American model and the British model as viewed in Thailand see
Tongdhamazhart, supra note 34, at 56-58.
S14 NPKC Insists on Full Separation of Powers, BANGKOK POST WKLY. REV., Mar. 22, 1991, at 3;
MAISRIKROD, supra note 13, at 22. The existence and prevalence of vote-buying and the attempts made in
the 1992 elections to "clean-up" the election process is discussed in MAISRJKROD, id, at 50-53.
115 See in particular the comments of former Parliamentary President Ukrit Mongkolnavin noted in
Meechai: Power Separation Deserves Widespread Debate, BANGKOK POST WKLY. REV., Mar. 29, 1991, at
3. Numerous division of powers proposals were considered. See Nattaya Chetchotiros & Banyat
Tasaneeyavej, Constitution Drafters Aim to Satisfy All Sides, BANGKOK POST WKLY. REV., May 31, 1991,
at 8 [hereinafter Chetchotiros & Tasaneeyavej, Constitution Drafters].
116 See RADTHATHAMMANOON [Constitution] (B.E. 2534, Dec. 9, 1991) §§ 159-166.
117 Samudavanija, supra note 4, at 325.
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House of Representatives."l 8 Other ministers need not be members of the
House of Representatives but, as is the case with the prime minister, a
minister may not be a government (or military) official."19
2. The Senate
The 1991 Constitution calls for the King to appoint 270 senators. 120
In contrast to the House of Representatives, there is no prohibition against
senators being government or military officials.121 Although Section 94
does not explicitly indicate who is to advise the King on Senate
appointments, this function belongs to the prime minister.122 However, the
first group of senators to be appointed under the 1991 Constitution were
appointed pursuant to Section 217, part of the Transition Chapter, which
directs that the King is to be advised on these selections by the President of
the National Peace-Keeping Council.123 These Senators are to be in office
for four years before the Senate-appointment provisions of the 1991
Constitution become operational.124 Pursuant to the Constitution, on the
March 1992, election day, the King appointed 270 senators. 125 Of these,
118 Amendment of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand No. 4.
119 RADTHATHAMMANOON [Constitution] (B.E. 2534, Dec. 9, 1991) § 162. The restriction on a
Minister from simultaneously being a military or government official was one of the significant tension
points in the drafting of the Constitution. Pursuant to this provision, when General Suchinda became
Prime Minister in April 1992 he resigned from the military. Rodney Tasker, Premier of Last Resort, FAR
E. ECON. REV., Apr. 16, 1992, at 10-11; Gen Suchinda Becomes PM, BANGKOK POST WKLY. REV., Apr.
17, 1992, at 1.
120 RADTHATHAMMANOON [Constitution] (B.E. 2534, Dec. 9, 1991) § 94. This figure represents
three-quarters of the number of elected members of the House of Representatives which has 360 members.
See id. § 99.
121 Id § 97.
122 The issue of who would advise the King on Senate appointments was, not surprisingly, a
controversial issue in the drafting of the 1991 Constitution. The Drafting Committee's original text created
a nine-person Constitutional Committee charged with the task of nominating 1,350 senatorial candidates
who would amongst themselves select the 270 senators. Tasaneeyavej, supra note 98, at 8. The Scrutiny
Committee scrapped the Constitutional Committee's proposal following heavy criticism. The Scrutiny
Committee accepted that, regarding Senate appointments, the King was to be advised by the Prime
Minister. Panel Unveils Controversial Draft Charter, supra note 100, at 1; see also Charter Panel Still
Undecided on Many Key Issues, BANGKOK POST WKLY. REv., Nov. 8, 1991, at 3.
123 The National Peace-Keeping Council is not explicitly recognized by the 1991 Constitution
except in the Transition Provisions. Presumably its existence as a constitutionally-recognized entity, so
recognized in § 18 of the Interim Constitution, expired with the Interim Constitution. The Interim
Constitution ceased to have effect when the new Council of Ministers took office following the March
1992 election. See RADTHATHAMMANOON [Constitution] (B.E. 2534, Dec. 9, 1991) § 216.
124 Id. § 217, para. 3.
125 Economic Giants Get Some Clout in 'Traditional' Senate, BANGKOK POST WKLY. REV., Apr. 3,
1992, at 3.
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154 were military or police officers and 116 civilians. The number of
civilians in the Senate is greater than in the pre-coup Senate (116 as
compared to 105), and only fifty-one people retained their Senate positions.
Of the civilians, Thailand's economic elite are well-represented. Only
seven women were appointed. 126
An indication of the extent to which constitutional reform is being
contemplated in Thailand is the consideration being given the elimination of
the Senate by the House Constitutional Amendments Committee. 127 At a
minimum, the Committee is considering recommending a reduction in the
size of the Senate and an alteration of the process by which senators are
appointed.128 The Senate could not unilaterally block the adoption of such
an amendment since a constitutional amendment requires a majority vote of
the Senate (270 members) and House of Representatives (360 members)
sitting together.129
3. The House ofRepresentatives
The 1991 Constitution stipulates that the elected House of
Representatives is to have 360 members. 130 The creation of election areas
or constituencies is to be by province. Provinces shall be assigned the
proportionate number of representatives their population dictates,' 3 1 with
each being entitled to at least one representative. 132 Where the population
of a province entitles it to more than three representatives, the province
shall be divided so that an election area or constituency has a maximum of
three representatives. 133 Voters are to directly elect representatives by
secret ballot. 134 At one stage in the drafting of the 1991 Constitution, direct
voting for candidates was to have been replaced with party slate voting by
which voters would choose parties rather than individuals. Despite its
adoption by the Constitutional Scrutiny Committee, however, the party slate
126 Id
127 New Look at Axing Senate, supra note 43, at 4.
128 Id
129 RADTHATHAMMANOON [Constitution] (B.E. 2534, Dec. 9, 1991) § 21. See supra text accompa-
nying notes 106-09.
130 RADTHATHAMMANOON [Constitution] (B.E. 2534, Dec. 9, 1991) § 99, para. 1.
131 Id § 100,para. 1.
132 Jd § 100, para. 2.
133 Id § 101, para. 1.
134 Id § 102, para. 1.
FEB. 1995
PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL
voting system was quickly withdrawn following massive criticism.13 5 Thus,
in its constitutionally-dictated form, the House of Representatives appears
to be representative of the general Thai population.
A certain House membership provision regarding party affiliation,
however, has the potential to reduce this representative tendency.
Candidates for the House of Representatives must not be military or
government officials. 136 Yet they must be members of a political party
which has at least 120 candidates in the election.13 7 Hence, there is no such
thing as an independent candidate or small, regional parties which is
problematic.
The idea that only a few large parties can finance their
elections, thus automatically eliminating small parties which
could become a destabilizing force in parliament, also has the
unintended effect of making money a very important factor in
electoral and party politics, and of strengthening the position of
businessmen - politicians who are the sponsors of leaders of the
parties.138
In sum, the requirement that candidates be members of large political
parties presents business elites with the opportunity to exert a
disproportionate amount of political power.
4. No-Confidence Motions
The key to the balance of power between the legislative and executive
levels of government, as well as between the elected House of
135 The party slate voting system was strongly favored by certain political parties and some vocal
members of the military establishment since it was seen as favoring well-financed and high profile candi-
dates. See Kasitipradit, Power Play, supra note 99, at 8; Tasker, Power Game, supra note 99, at 12.
The party slate voting system was rejected by the Drafting Committee because of the possible undue
influence of big money. See Banyat Tasaneeyavej, Senators to Have More Clout in New Charter,
BANGKOK POST WKLY. REv., July 5, 1991, at 3; Chetchotiros & Tasaneeyavej, Constitution Drafters,
supra note 115, at 8. The Scrutiny Committee sought to incorporate the party slate voting system into the
Constitution but almost immediately reversed itself. Panel Unveils Controversial Draft Charter, supra
note 100, at 1. The party slate voting system was initially in the 1978 Constitution but was removed and
replaced by a direct voting system by Constitutional Amendment in 1985. See Samudavanija, supra note
4, at 326.
136 See RADTHATHAMMANOON [Constitution] (B.E. 2534, Dec. 9, 1991) § 107(9).
137 See id. §§ 105(3), 106.
138 Chantorvong & Chenvidyakarn, supra note 6, at 158.
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Representatives and the non-elected Senate is the ability to use and control
no-confidence motions. 139 An individual minister or the entire Council of
Ministers must step aside if a no-confidence motion is approved.140
Following an amendment made to the 1991 Constitution in June 1992, the
no-confidence apparatus is totally within the hands of the elected House of
Representatives. The June 1992 amendment repealed a provision in the
Transition Chapter which allowed the Senate, for the first four years
following the adoption of the 1991 Constitution, to participate in and vote
on no-confidence motions. 141  Thus, as between the House of
Representatives and Senate, the House is clearly the dominant body, and the
Council of Ministers is directly responsible to the elected House.
B. The Legislative Process
The pre-eminence of the executive branch of government vis-A-vis
the elected House of Representatives and the appointed Senate is
constitutionally entrenched by the process that has been established for
enacting bills into law. 142 Three categories of bills have been created:
regular bills; finance bills;143 and, as a subset of finance bills, budget
bills.144 The Constitution clearly states that it is the function of the Council
of Ministers to prepare bills and submit them to the House of
Representatives. 145 Bills may only originate in the House of
139 The term no-confidence is not specifically used in the translation of § 150 of the 1991
Constitution, although it is used in § 137 of the 1978 Constitution, the model for the 1991 provision. See
RADTHATHAMMANOON [Constitution] (B.E. 2534, Dec. 9, 1991) § 150; RADTHATHAMMANOON
[Constitution] (B.E. 2521, Dec. 22, 1978) § 137..
140 RADTHATHAMMANOON [Constitution] (B.E. 2534, Dec. 9, 1991) §§ 168(1), 169(5).
141 Id § 221, repealed by Amendment of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand No. 3 (Int'l
Translations Office trans., Thail., June 29, 1992).
142 In large measure, the relevant provisions of the 1991 Constitution, §§ 87-89 and §§ 137-146,
follow the process established in the 1978 Constitution, §§ 76-78 and §§ 125-133. See
RADTHATHAMMANOON [Constitution] (B.E. 2534, Dec. 9, 1991) §§ 87-89, 137-146;
RADTHATHAMMANOON [Constitution] (B.E. 2521, Dec. 22, 1978) §§ 76-78, 125-133.
143 Finance bills are bills not covered by § 146 of the 1991 Constitution (see infra notes 159-63)
but which involve: establishing or changing taxes or duties; expenditure of state funds; establishment of an
agency which results in increased government expenditure; borrowing; or the currency.
RADTHATHAMMANOON [Constitution] (B.E. 2534, Dec. 9, 1991) § 137, para. 3. The determination of
whether a bill is a finance bill is to be made by the Speaker of the House of Representatives. Id § 137,
para. 4.
144 The bills that have been labeled as budget bills are those listed in § 146 of the 1991
Constitution: the Annual Expenditure Budget Bill; the Bill on Additional Budget, and the Bill on Transfer
ofExpnditures. Id § 146.
45 ld § 137, para. 1.
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Representatives if the political party of the bill's proponent has agreed to
support it and there are at least twenty members of that political party in the
House to certify their support. 146 Moreover, if the proposed bill is a finance
bill, the bill must be ratified by the prime minister.147
1. Finance and Regular Bills
The House of Representatives is responsible for considering finance
and regular bills and, if approved, they are sent to the Senate. 148 The Senate
has sixty days in the case of regular bills or thirty days in the case of finance
bills for deliberation.149 If a bill is approved by the Senate, it will become
law when presented by the prime minister to and signed by the King.i5 0 If
the Senate makes no determination on the bill by the end of the applicable
time period, the bill is deemed to have been approved.151 Where a bill is
rejected by the Senate, the bill is considered withheld, and it is returned to
the House of Representatives for reconsideration following a 180-day
period.152 If a withheld bill is a finance bill, it can be reconsidered by the
House immediately. 5 3 If, upon reconsideration of a withheld bill, the bill is
reaffirmed by the House of Representatives, Senate approval is dispensed
with, and the bill is to be forwarded to the King for signature. 5 4 During the
period that a bill is withheld, no bill having the same or similar contents
may be proposed.155 Where a bill is amended by the Senate and the
amendment is approved by the House, the bill shall proceed to the King for
signature. 156 Alternatively, if the amendment is not accepted, a joint
commission of the House and Senate shall consider the bill, and propose a
single bill to the House and Senate. 157  Again the bill is considered a
146 Id § 137, paras. 1-2.
147 Id § 137, para. 1.
148 Jd § 140, para. 1.
149 Id § 140, para. I.
I50 Id § 88.
151 Id § 140, para. 3.
152 Id §§ 141, para. 1, 142, para. 1.
153 Id § 142, para. 2.
154 Id § 142, paras. 1-2.
155 Id § 143, para. 1. If doubt arises whether a submitted bill is the same as or similar to a withheld
bill, the President of the Senate or Speaker of the House of Representatives is to submit the bills to the
Constitutional Judicial Council (Constitutional Tribunal) for a ruling. Id § 143, para. 2. The
Constitutional Tribunal is described below. See infra text accompanying notes 20 1-33.
156 RADTHATHAMMANOON [Constitution] (B.E. 2534, Dec. 9, 1991) § 141, para. 1(3).
157 The size and composition of the Joint Commission is not set out in the 1991 Constitution.
There is, however, no requirement for its members to be members of the House or Senate. Clearly, the task
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withheld bill and subject to the same rules as noted above, including the
requirement that only the House need approve the bill proposed by the Joint
Commission.158
2. Budget Bills
Regarding budget bills, the House of Representatives has ninety days
to dispose of the bill or it is considered to have been approved, 159 whereas
the Senate has fifteen days. 160 The House of Representatives has no ability
to amend a budget bill as it is restricted to using non-binding motions
regarding minor amendments.161 Although the Constitution is not explicit
on this point, a vote by the House of Representatives to reject a budget bill
could be taken as a no-confidence vote in the executive and lead to the
resignation of all or some of the Council of Ministers. In contrast, a
negative vote by the Senate on a budget bill simply returns the bill to the
House of Representatives and hence would not amount to a direct no-
confidence vote. 162 Thus, although the Parliament has less power over
budget bills, the House clearly appears to be able to exert some influence on
the executive level of government with regard to the process of passing such
bills.
3. Final Approval of Bills
As noted, all bills approved by Parliament are to be presented by the
prime minister to the King for signature. 163 Where a bill remains unsigned
by the King, the House of Representatives and Senate sitting in joint session
shall reconsider the bill, and if a two-thirds vote of the joint sitting
approves, the bill shall be resubmitted to the King. If the King still does not
sign the bill, after thirty days the prime minister shall publish the bill as a
law. 164
of the Joint Commission is to reconcile the versions of a bill supported by the House and Senate. Id §
141(3t58 See id §§ 142-43.
59 Id § 146, para. 2.
160 Id § 146, para. 3.
161 Id § 146, para. 5.
162 Id§ 146, para. 4.
163 Id § 88.
164 Id §89.
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4. Emergency or Executive Decrees and Royal Proclamations
Emergency or Executive Decrees and Royal Proclamations are to be
enforced as acts of law. They can be issued by the King upon advice of the
Council of Ministers regarding 1) tax and monetary matters, 165 and 2) emer-
gency situations which require action to maintain national security, public
safety, national economic well-being or to avert public disasters.166 In the
latter case, an Emergency or Executive Decree is only to be used when the
Council of Ministers has considered the emergency situation
unavoidable. 167 This paragraph is not found in the relevant provision in the
1978 Constitution, Section 157. The requirement that the Council of
Ministers consider the situation an unavoidable emergency raises the
threshold of when an Emergency Decree can be issued. Thus, it appears to
be designed to confine use of the Decrees to true emergencies and not just
for executive convenience.
All Emergency or Executive Decrees and Royal Proclamations must
be considered by Parliament at the first opportunity and either formally
accepted as laws or rejected.168 The Transition provisions of the 1991
Constitution indicated that during the first four years acceptance or rejection
of Emergency or Executive Decrees was to be based on approval of the
House of Representatives and Senate sitting together. 169 One of the June
1992 Constitutional Amendments removed this requirement.170 Under the
amendment, an Emergency Decree rejected by the House of Representatives
alone ceases to have the force of law, although rejection does not affect the
legality of any action taken while the Decree was in effect. 171 The
operation of this provision came under scrutiny in the aftermath of the May
1992 crackdown. By Emergency Decree, an amnesty was granted to all
those involved in the bloodshed including those who ordered the use of
165 Id § 174, para. 1.
166 Id § 172, para. 1. Although described as Emergency Decrees in the Constitution, they are
commonly referred to as Executive Decrees.
167 Id § 172, para. 2.
168 See id § 172, paras. 3,5,6.
169 Id §§ 219, para. 1(2), 221.
170 Amendment of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand No. 3 (Int'l Translations Office
trans., Thail., June 29, 1992). This amendment repealed § 221 of the 1991 Constitution.
171 RADTHATHAMMANOON [Constitution] (B.E. 2534, Dec. 9, 1991) § 172, para. 3. Section 172,
para. 4 indicates that in the case of a rejected executive decree the pre-existing law comes back into effect.
Id § 172, para. 4.
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force. 172 Although the House of Representatives overwhelmingly rejected
acceptance of the amnesty decree, 173 the amnesty granted by the decree is
considered to still be valid. 174
5. Royal Decrees
In addition to legislation enacted through the above processes, the
1991 Constitution grants the King the authority to issue Royal Decrees.
175
These acts are not subject to parliamentary approval and have an equal
standing to legislation passed by parliament. The only qualification
imposed by the Constitution is that Royal Decrees are not to be
contradictory to existing laws. 176 Presumably, if such a contradiction exists,
the Royal Decree would be inoperative to the extent of the contradiction.
Royal Decrees are issued by the King upon the advice of the Council of
Ministers, although this practice is not explicitly provided for in the
Constitution. 177 Again, this power to grant Royal Decrees indicates the
extent to which the executive level of government clearly has the upper
hand in its relationship with the Parliament.
C. The Judiciary
The independence of the Thai judiciary, while provided for in the
1991 Constitution, can be considered as another constitutional imperative in
Thailand. Traditionally, the Thai King was the final arbiter of disputes, and
the Courts inherited both the role of decision-maker and the prestige of
172 Emergency Decree on Amnesty For Offenders in the 17-20 May 1992 Incident (Int'l
Translations Office trans., Thail., May 23, 1992) (Thai version in 109 RAADCHAKIDJAA [ROYAL THAI
GOV'T GAZETTE] pt. 63 (1992)) [hereinafter Emergency Decree on Amnesty]. The details of this Decree
are noted in Tribunal Discusses Amnesty Decree, BANGKOK POST WKLY. REV., June 5, 1992, at 3
[hereinafter Tribunal Discusses Amnesty Decree].
173 Amnesty Fears, FARE. ECON. REV., Oct. 22, 1992, at 14 [hereinafter Amnesty Fears].
174 This was the finding of the Constitutional Judicial Council (Constitutional Tribunal) which was
examining the constitutionality and legal effect of the Amnesty Decree. Tribunal Rules in Support of May
Amnesty, BANGKOK POST WKLY. REV., Nov. 20, 1992, at 3 [hereinafter Tribunal Rules in Support of May
Amnesty]; Paul Handley, Amnesty Upheld, FAR E. ECON. REV., Nov. 26, 1992, at 18 [hereinafter Handley,
Amnesty Upheld]. The work of the Constitutional Tribunal on this case and more generally is discussed
below. See infra text accompanying notes 201-33.
175 RADTHATHAMMANOON [Constitution] (B.E. 2534, Dec. 9, 1991) § 175.
176 Id
177 Regarding Royal Decrees and the types and hierarchy of laws in Thailand see MONTRI
HONGSKRAILERS, COMMERCIAL, BUSINESS AND TRADE LAWS - THAILAND 8-11 (1984).
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being an agent of the Monarch.17 8 In 1908, the court structure was
established in its current form with the adoption of a professional judiciary,
and its independence from political and bureaucratic interference was one of
its most important features.179 As one commentator has noted, despite the
political change in this century, "the centralized judicial system emerged
intact from the political mold in which it was formed, with a permanent
shape and legitimacy of its own."180 This legitimacy and independence of
the judiciary has been credited as a factor in assuring that authoritarian
leaders in Thailand have not exercised their power in an unduly repressive
manner.181 In the past, interference with the independence of the judiciary,
even during periods of military rule, led to wide-scale protests and the
ultimate removal of the offending measure.18 2
The principal mechanism in the 1991 Constitution for maintaining the
arms-length relationship between the judiciary and executive levels of
government is the Judicial Service Commission. The Judicial Service
Commission is constitutionally charged with the responsibility for
appointing, promoting, penalizing, and dismissing judges. 83  The
Commission has twelve members: four elected by senior judges; four
elected by retired judges; and four ex-officio members including the
President of the Supreme Court who assumes the Chair.184  The
Constitution further protects judicial independence by: 1) preventing
political officials from being judges;185 2) prohibiting the establishment of
178 For a brief history of the judiciary in Thailand see YEARBOOK, supra note 54, at 262-67; see
also ENGEL, supra note 71, at 18-24; DAVID M. ENGEL, LAW AND KINGSHIP IN THAILAND DURING THE
REIGN OF KING CHULALONGKORN 59-93 (1975).
179 See YEARBOOK, supra note 54, at 265-66.
180 ENGEL, supra note 71, at 25.
181 Samudavanija, supra note 4, at 337. "An independent and long-standing judiciary is another
institution that has always been safeguarding the encroachment of civil liberties. It is an autonomous body
not subjected to the control of the military and the bureaucracy, but has its own independent recruitment
and appointment procedures." Id
182 For example, in late 1972, the military-led National Executive Council under Field Marshall
Thanom Kittikachom, decreed that the Minister of Justice would become more involved in the administra-
tion of the judiciary. This action was seen as an attack on the independence of the judiciary and, following
wide-scale protests, the decree was withdrawn. See R.H. Hickling, Recent Constitutional and Legal
Developments in Thailand, 3 H.K. L. J. 215, 219-22 (1973). It should also be noted that the 1991 Interim
Thai Constitution explicitly protected the independence of the judiciary. See RADTHATHAMMANOON
[Constitution] (B.E. 2534, Mar. 1, 1991) § 29.
183 RADTHATHAMMANOON [Constitution] (B.E. 2534, Dec. 9, 1991) § 193.
184 Concerning the Judicial Service Commission see Marut Bunnag and Preben A.F. Aakesson, The
Legal System of Thailand, in MODERN LEGAL SYSTEMS CYCLOPEDIA 340.18-340.19 (K.R. Redden gen.
ed., 1987); YEARBOOK, supra note 54, at 271-72.
185 RADTHATHAMMANOON [Constitution] (B.E. 2534, Dec. 9, 1991) § 191.
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special courts to replace existing courts to hear specific cases;18 6 3)
prohibiting the enactment of a law to deprive a court of its jurisdiction for
any specific case; 187 and 4) explicitly stating that judges shall be
independent in deliberating on cases.1 88
The operation of the Judicial Service Commission has been hampered
by factionalism. Intense factional fighting within the Thai judiciary led the
Commission, dominated by one faction, to take questionable actions against
senior judges of a rival faction.' 89 Consequently, the government of Prime
Minister Anand issued an Executive Decree in September 1992, abolishing
the twelve-member Commission and replacing it with a twenty-eight-
member panel which would include only six elected members.190 The
Executive Decree was criticized as an assault on the independence of the
judiciary and questioned because it was issued by a caretaker government
on the eve of the September 1992 election. 191 When the Executive Decree
was presented to the House of Representatives as required by the
Constitution, 192 the House voted against its adoption,. and a twelve-member
Judicial Services Commission was reinstated. 193  While the internal
186 Id § 188.
187 Id § 189.
188 Id. § 190.
189 For a summary of the feuding within the Thai judiciary in 1991-92 see Judgment Days,
MANAGER: THAILAND'S BUSINESS MONTHLY, Nov. 1992, at 40-41.
190 Royal Proclamation Amending the Act On Judicial Officer Regulation Act B.E. 2521 (Int'l
Translations Office trans., Thail., Sept. 11, 1992) (Thai version in 109 RAADCHAKIDJAA [ROYAL THAI
GOV'T GAZETrE] pt. 94 (1992)). Regarding the contents of the Decree and the justification for its issuance
see Govt Agrees to Postpone Reshuffle of Senior Judges, BANGKOK POST WKLY. REV., Sept 25, 1995, at 5
[hereinafter Govt Agrees to Postpone Reshuffle]; Premier Defends Executive Decree on Judicial
Commission, BANGKOK POST WKLY. REV., Sept. 25, 1992, at 5.
191 Vitit Muntarbhom, Independence Very Important in Judiciary, THE NATION, Sept. 22, 1992.
While public protest of the Decree was limited, within the legal community the reaction was much
stronger. Petitions from judges, lawyers and students were presented to the government See Govt Agrees
to Postpone Reshuffle, supra note 190, at 5; Judicial Panel Reshuffles Top Judges, BANGKOK POST WKLY.
REV., Oct. 2, 1992, at 5 [hereinafter Judicial Panel Reshuffles Top Judges].
192 RADTHATHAMMANOON [Constitution] (B.E. 2534, Dec. 9, 1991) § 172, paras. 3,5,6.
193 Pursuant to the September 1992 Executive Decree, the sitting Judicial Services Commission
was disbanded and the enlarged Commission began operation. Despite clear indications that the Executive
Decree establishing the new Commission would be rescinded by the House, that the Justice Minister felt
any action by the Commission was unwarranted, and that there existed widespread disapproval within the
legal community, the enlarged Commission appointed a new President of the Supreme Court and promoted
numerous other judges. These new appointments were not acted upon by either the Minister of Justice or
the King.
Following rejection of the Executive Decree, a new 12-member Judicial Services Commission was
established under the pre-decree legislation. This Commission recommended a different President of the
Supreme Court who, although initially vetoed by the Justice Minister, was reaffirmed by the Commission
and received the assent of the King. See Govt Agrees to Postpone Reshuffle, supra note 190, at 5; Judicial
Panel Reshuffles Top Judges, supra note 191, at 5; Pramarn Faction Wins Judicial Panel Election,
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squabbles were bringing discredit to the Thai judiciary, the maneuver by the
executive level of government was seen as a possible assault on the
independence of the Thai judiciary. As a result, both the Justice Ministry
and the Special House Committee on Judiciary Affairs are looking at
possible changes to the Judicial Service Commission to make it more open
and to reduce the potential for factionalism.194
While the 1991 Thai Constitution reaffirms the constitutional impera-
tive of judicial independence, it also reaffirms the inability of the courts to
rule. on the constitutionality of government measures. 195 In short, Thai
courts do not have the authority to judicially review the constitutionality of
government action. In the past, it has been only on the rarest of occasions
that a Thai court has used the law or the Constitution to restrain actions
taken by the government. 196 Yet in a potential landmark decision in March
1993, the Thai Supreme Court found an order issued by the coup leaders
unconstitutional.197  The Court based their jurisdiction to review the
measure's constitutionality on "general legal principles under which the
courts have the authority to decide if any particular laws are constitutional
or not in relation to cases under deliberation." 198 However, the 1991
Constitution was determined not to be applicable to the decision.199 Under
the 1991 Constitution, the authority to review the constitutionality of
government measures is vested in the Constitutional Judicial Council, better
known as the Constitutional Tribunal.200
BANGKOK POST WKLY. REV., Oct. 30, 1992, at 5; Judicial Joyride for Pramarn, BANGKOK POST WKLY.
REV., Nov. 13, 1992, at 9; Judicial Panel Insists on Pramarnfor Top Post, BANGKOK POST WKLY. REV.,
Nov. 20, 1992, at4.
194 Minister Suvit Calls Meeting of Judges over Judicial Reform Plan, BANGKOK POST WKLY.
REV., Nov. 6, 1992, at 20; Battle Shapes Up over Key Charter Changes, BANGKOK POST WKLY. REV., Apr.
23, 1993, at 4 [hereinafter Battle Shapes Up].
195 RADTHATHAMMANOON [Constitution] (B.E. 2534, Dec. 9, 1991) § 206, para. I. This provision
replicates § 191, para. I of the 1978 Constitution. See RADTHATHAMMANOON [Constitution] (B.E. 2521,
Dec. 22, 1978) § 191, para. 1.
196 One clear example was in 1952, when a court ruled that a government official had gone beyond
the limits of the law in imposing censorship on a newspaper. Noted in DHIRAVEGIN, supra note 4, at 139.
197 Chetchotiros & Rojanalak, Pandora's Box, supra note 41, at 4. See supra text accompanying
notes 80-86.
198 Chetchotiros & Rojanalak, Pandora's Box, supra note 41, at 4.
199 See commentary supra note 84.
200 The body is called the Constitution Judicial Council in the translated 1991 Constitution. See
RADTHATHAMMANOON [Constitution] (B.E. 2534, Dec. 9, 1991) chapt. 10. Yet in the first amendment to
the 1991 Constitution it is called the Constitution Judiciary Commission. See Amendment of the
Constitution of Thailand No. I (Int'l Translations Office trans., Thail., June 29, 1992). The 1978
Constitution and the press refer to it as the Constitutional Tribunal. See RADTHATHAMMANOON
[Constitution] (B.E. 2521, Dec. 22, 1978).
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D. The Constitutional Tribunal
The Constitutional Tribunal, as established by the 1991 Constitution,
has ten members: the President of the Parliament (the Speaker of the House
of Representatives); 201 the President of the Senate; the President of the Dika
Court (the Supreme Court of Thailand); the Chief of the Department of
Public Prosecutions;202 and six appointed persons, three appointed by the
House of Representatives and three by the Senate.203 The six appointees,
who hold their positions for four years, are required to be qualified in
jurisprudence or political science, and they are prohibited from being
members of Parliament or government (military) officials.204  This
composition of the Tribunal indicates its political, rather than legal,
function.
Under the 1991 Constitution, when the constitutionality of a govern-
ment measure is raised, courts are to suspend the case and refer the
constitutional issue to the Constitutional Tribunal for decision.205 The
Constitutional Tribunal can also be requested to review the constitutionality
of a bill by the Prime Minister,206 or by the House of Representatives or
Senate if one-fifth of the members of the two houses request review of a
bill.207 In addition, the Constitutional Tribunal can be requested to interpret
the Constitution by the Council of Ministers or pursuant to a resolution of
either the House of Representatives or Senate.208 The final explicit function
regarding constitutionality that the Tribunal can be asked to perform is to
201 One of the June 1992 amendments to the 1991 Constitution made the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, rather than the President of the Senate, the President of Parliament. See Amendment of
the Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand No. I (Int'l Translations Office trans., Thail., June 29, 1992).
This amendment repealed §§ 86, 200 of the 1991 Constitution and replaced them with new provisions.
202 The June 1992 amended version of § 200 of the 1991 Constitution refers to this person as the
Attorney General, while the pre-amended version uses the term Chief Public Prosecutor. See
RADTHATHAMMANOON [Constitution] (B.E. 2534, Dec. 9, 1991) § 200; Amendment of the Constitution of
the Kingdom of Thailand No. I (Int'l Translations Office trans., Thail., June 29, 1992).
203 RADTHATHAMMANOON [Constitution] (B.E. 2534, Dec. 9, 1991) § 200, para. 1, as amended by
Amendment of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand No. I (Int'l Translations Office trans., Thail.,
June 29, 1992).
204 See id § 200; RADTHATHAMMANOON [Constitution] (B.E. 2534, Dec. 9, 1991) §§ 201, 202,
para. 1. The four year term for the appointees is a change from the 1978 Constitution. Note New Charter
Likely by October, BANGKOK POST WKLY. REV., July 26, 199 1, at 1.
205 RADTHATHAMMANOON [Constitution] (B.E. 2534, Dec. 9, 1991) § 206, par. I.
206 Id § 205, para. 1(2).
207 Id § 205, para. 1(I).
208 Id § 207.
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determine whether a regulation regarding the conducting of business in
either the House of Representatives or Senate is consistent with the
Constitution.209
The Constitutional Tribunal has other tasks assigned to it by the 1991
Constitution which do not, strictly speaking, involve determination of the
constitutionality of a measure. For example, where a question arises
regarding one court's jurisdiction to deal with a matter as against another
court, the issue is to be referred to the Constitutional Tribunal. 210 As
previously noted, if there is uncertainty whether a newly-introduced bill is
similar to a withheld bill, the question is to be referred to the Constitutional
Tribunal.2 11 The Tribunal can also be requested to examine whether a
member of either the Senate or House of Representatives is to be removed
because the requirements for termination of the member's position have
been met.212  This provision has been carried over from the 1978
Constitution 213 with one interesting additional element. Membership in the
House of Representatives can be terminated by the Constitutional Tribunal
if there is reliable evidence that the member was elected through
corruption. 214 The purpose of this new provision is to eliminate the
perceived, widespread vote-buying at elections. 215  Finally, the
Constitutional Tribunal can be requested by the Prime Minister to determine
whether a cabinet minister has met the criteria for termination, the most
important being that a Minister is in a conflict of interest position regarding
their portfolio.216 This provision, new to the 1991 Constitution, is designed
to deal with potential executive level conflict of interest situations.
209 Id. § 155.
210 Id. § 195.
211 Id § 143, para. 2. See supra note 155.
212 RADTHATHAMMANOON [Constitution] (B.E. 2534, Dec. 9, 1991) § 91, para. I. The
Constitutional Tribunal only gets involved if the request is supported by one-third of the members of the
House of Representatives or Senate, as the case may be. Membership in the Senate is to be terminated if
any of the events listed in § 97 occur. Id § 97. For membership in the House of Representatives, the list is
in § 114. Id § 114.
It should be noted that § 92 of the 1991 Constitution allows for termination of membership in the
House of Representatives or Senate if three-quarters of the members in the relevant body votes to terminate
membership. Id. § 92. To trigger § 92, the act of a member must be either detrimental to the dignity of the
Parliament or one of its members; constitute malfeasance in office; or be an offense against officials of the
State Legislative Assembly. Id This provision does not require recourse to the Constitutional Tribunal.2 1  Id § 81.
214 See id. §§ 107(12), 114, para. 1(5), 91, para. 1(I); MPs Who Bribe Face Ousterfrom House,
BANGKOK POsT WKLY. REv., June 28, 1991, at 4 [hereinafter MPs Who Bribe].
215 MPs Who Bribe, supra note 214, at 4.
216 RADTHATHAMMANOON [Constitution] (B.E. 2534, Dec. 9, 1991) §§ 170, 169, para. 1(6), 163.
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Reference has already been made to Emergency or Executive Decrees
that can be issued where there is an emergency requiring action to be taken
to maintain national security, public safety, national economic well-being or
to avert public disasters.217 The 1991 Constitution, in a departure from its
1978 predecessor, provides an opportunity for the Constitutional Tribunal to
examine whether a Decree issued as an Emergency Decree in fact complies
with the relevant Constitutional provisions.218 The purpose of this new
procedure is apparently to ensure that Decrees are used for true emergencies
and not merely to temporarily avoid the elected House of
Representatives. 219
One-fifth of the members of either the House of Representatives or
the Senate can request that the Constitutional Tribunal examine an alleged
Emergency Decree prior to the Decree being approved or disapproved by
Parliament.220 As previously noted, rejection of an Emergency Decree by
the House of Representatives does not affect the legal validity of the Decree
from the time of its issuance to the time of disapproval.221 However, if the
Constitutional Tribunal decides that a decree is invalid, the decree is invalid
ab initio.222 A narrow reading of the relevant provisions suggests that the
Constitutional Tribunal can only examine whether a decree was issued for
the specific purposes listed in Section 172(1) of the Constitution.223 A
decision that a decree does not comply with the constitutional requirements
for an Emergency Decree must be made by two-thirds of the members of the
Constitutional Tribunal. 224
In one of the most important cases concerning the political events
surrounding the 1991 Constitution, the Constitutional Tribunal was
requested by the House of Representatives to examine the Executive Decree
217 Id § 172, para. 1. See supra notes 165-74.
218 RADTHATHAMMANOON [Constitution] (B.E. 2534, Dec. 9, 1991) § 173, para. 1.
219 Emergency or Executive Decrees must be brought before the House of Representatives for
approval at the first opportunity. Id § 172, para. 3. See supra notes 164-67.
220 RADTHATHAMMANOON [Constitution] (B.E. 2534, Dec. 9, 1991) § 173, para. 1.
221 Id § 172, para. 3. See supra notes 168-71.
222 RADTHATHAMMANOON [Constitution] (B.E. 2534, Dec. 9, 1991) § 173, para. 2.
223 These purposes have already been noted:- maintenance of national security, public safety,
national economic well-being or to avert public disasters. The narrow reading is based upon § 173, para. 1
of the 1991 Constitution which explicitly directs that the Constitutional Tribunal is to examine whether a
decree has been issued in accordance with § 172, paragraph one. Id §§ 172-173. Specific reference to §
172, paragraph one is reiterated in § 173, paras. 3 and 4. Id The effect of this is that the Constitutional
Tribunal may not be able to examine the surrounding circumstances of the issuance of the decree and
whether the Council of Ministers, as required in § 172, para. 2, considered there to be an unavoidable
emergency, Id. § 172.
22 4 Id § 173, para. 4.
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which provided amnesty for those involved in the May 1992, crackdown on
pro-democracy protesters.225 The first challenge to the Decree was that it
was not in keeping with the requirement that the Council of Ministers can
only issue an Emergency Decree in an emergency because no emergency
existed. 226 The Tribunal rejected this challenge. The Chair of the Tribunal
reportedly explained that it was not open for anyone to challenge a decision
of the Council of Ministers as to whether or not an emergency existed.227
The House of Representatives then asked the Tribunal to examine if the
Amnesty Decree was issued in accordance with the relevant Constitutional
provision (Section 172, paragraph 1), arguing that there did not exist a
situation requiring the Decree in order to maintain national security, public
safety or avert public disasters. The Constitutional Tribunal rejected this
challenge as well. The Chair of the panel reportedly explained that the
Decree was issued following loss of life, and the situation being volatile, it
was determined that the issuing of the Decree was justified. 228 Following
rejection of the Amnesty Decree by the House of Representatives, 229 the
Council of Ministers requested the Constitutional Tribunal to determine
whether the Constitution provided that the amnesty granted by the
discredited Decree was still legally effective. The Tribunal ruled that
despite the disapproval of the Amnesty Decree by the House of
Representatives, the Decree was legally effective according to the
Constitution.230 Thus, the Constitutional Tribunal squarely faced the issues
presented rather than hiding behind legal technicalities, such as lack ofjurisdiction.231 In this regard, the Tribunal showed a pragmatism that may
encourage future recourse in cases where the government is considered to
have strayed from the Constitution.
225 Emergency Decree on Amnesty, supra note 172. The details of the Decree are noted in
Tribunal Discusses Amnesty Decree, supra note 172, at 3.
226 The thrust of the first challenge is noted in Amnesty Accepted as Constitutional, BANGKOK POST
WKLY. REV., June 12, 1992, at 20 [hereinafter Amnesty Accepted as Constitutional]. The provision being
challenged was § 172, para. 2 of the 1991 Constitution. It apparently was not suggested that the
Constitutional Tribunal was barred by the Constitution from examining the validity of an Emergency
Decree by looking at § 172, para. 2. See RADTHATHAMMANOON [Constitution] (B.E. 2534, Dec. 9, 1991) §
173, para. I.22 Amnesty Accepted as Constitutional, supra note 226, at 20.
228 Tribunal Upholds Controversial Amnesty Decree, BANGKOK POST WKLY. REV., July 31, 1992,
at 1.
229 Amnesty Fears, supra note 173.
230 Tribunal Rules in Support of May Amnesty, supra note 174, at 3; Handley, Amnesty Upheld,
supra note 174, at 18. The Constitutional provision in question was § 172, para. 3 of the 1991
Constitution.
231 See supra note 226.
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The outcome of the Constitutional Tribunal decisions, however, can
be criticized since the result is that the Amnesty Decree remains valid which
is contrary to justice and arguably creates disrespect for the Constitutional
Tribunal and the Constitution more generally. These issues and the political
impartiality of the Tribunal were brought into question following the
Supreme Court's willingness to find that one of the orders issued by the
coup leaders was unconstitutional. 232 Moreover, the legitimacy of the
Constitutional Tribunal has been further undermined by the government's
proposals to amend the 1991 Constitution and eliminate the Constitutional
Tribunal which would leave constitutional issues to be decided by the courts
or possibly a constitutional court independent of the political process. 233
E. The Citizenry: Rights; Responsibilities; and State Policy
Three chapters of the 1991 Constitution directly or indirectly relate to
the citizens of Thailand: Chapter Three, Rights and Freedoms of the Thai
People; Chapter Four, Responsibilities of the Thai People; and Chapter
Five, State Policy. The latter chapter deals only indirectly with the Thai
citizenry as it sets out guidelines for state action, but much of its contents
relates to citizens and like the other two chapters, is hortatory.
Amongst other things, Chapter Five of the 1991 Constitution
provides that the state is to:
" maintain, promote and develop equality between the sexes;234
" maintain the environment and protect against pollution;235
• provide social welfare and assist and provide social welfare to
the aged and disabled; 236
* protect laborers, especially women and children, and provide
for fair wages; 237
• promote standard public health and provide health assistance
to the poor free of charge;238
232 This decision is commented upon above. See supra notes 80-86.
233 Battle Shapes Up, supra note 194, at 4.
234 RADTHATHAMMANOON [Constitution] (B.E. 2534, Dec. 9, 1991) § 68.
235 ld. § 74.
236 Id. § 80-81.
237 Id § 82.
238 Id. § 83.
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* let farmers have possession of lands through land reform,
allocation or other means; 239
" preserve and maintain the arts and culture of the nation;240
• promote understanding of and belief in the kingship
democratic system;241 and
a support the private sector to play its role in the economy.242
Despite its imposition on the state of numerous duties towards the citizenry,
however, Chapter Five includes a provision that none of the objectives con-
tained in it give rise to a right to sue the state.243
Some of the responsibilities placed on the Thai people by Chapter
Four of the 1991 Constitution are the duties to:
" exercise the right to vote; 244
• comply with the law;245
• pay tax as prescribed by law;246 and
• conserve natural resources and the environment as prescribed
by law.247
Thus, just as it imposes duties on the state towards the people, the
1991 Constitution makes several demands on the people with respect
to the state.
The constitutional rights of the Thai people are set out in Chapter
Three,248 and they include most of the universally recognized rights, for
example:
239 Jd. § 76, para. 1.
240 d § 72.
241 Id. § 70.
242 Id § 77, para. 1.
243 Id. § 59.
244 Id § 51.
245 Id § 54.
246 Id § 55.
247 Id. § 58.
248 For a brief history of the rights of Thai people in the various constitutions see SHIN, supra note
32, at 40-5 1. Aakesson, Bunnag and Bunnag comment: "[A] number of rights and privileges enjoyed by
the Thai people now ... are guaranteed by the Constitution. However, many such rights have their roots
and beginnings in the days of the early absolute monarchs." Aakesson et al., supra note 46, at 670. They
go on to discuss many of those rights. Id. at 670-80.
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" equality under and equal protection of the law;249
" freedom of religion;250
" presumption of innocence in criminal cases;251
" freedom from arbitrary arrest, detention or search;252
" freedom of speech, including freedom of the press;253
" freedom of assembly;254
" freedom of association;255
" freedom of movement within Thailand;256
" the right to sue government officials; 257
" the right of criminally accused indigents to legal aid;258
" the right to property;259 and
" the right to conduct business or engage in the occupation of
choice.260
The Thai people's ability to exercise and enforce these rights, however, is
also somewhat limited by the Constitution.
249 RADTHATHAMMANOON [Constitution] (B.E. 2534, Dec. 9, 1991) § 25. Section 4 affirms that all
Thai people are equally protected under the Constitution. Id § 4. Concerning the position of women in
Thailand see the materials cited supra note 67.
250 RADTHATHAMMANOON [Constitution] (B.E. 2534, Dec. 9, 1991) § 27. The right is qualified by
the requirement that religious beliefs are not to be in conflict with one's duty as a citizen or be against the
peace, order or morals of the people. Id See also text accompanying and materials cited supra note 75.
251 RADTHATHAMMANOON [Constitution] (B.E. 2534, Dec. 9, 1991) § 29.
252 Id § 30. Arrest, detention or searches may be conducted in accordance with the law. Id
253 Id § 37, para. 1. Restrictions on freedom of speech may be employed under provisions of
national security law, to maintain peace, order and public morality, and to protect the freedom, honor and
good name of individuals. Id § 37, para. 2. Regarding freedom of the press see the materials cited supra
note 74.
254 RADTHATHAMMANOON [Constitution] (B.E. 2534, Dec. 9, 1991) § 39, para. 1. Limitations on
this freedom may exist under special laws regarding public meetings, to protect use of public places, or
during times of emergency or martial law. Id § 39, para. 2.
255 Id § 40, para. 1. Paragraph 2, however, indicates that the establishment, operation or dissolu-
tion of associations, unions, federations, and cooperatives shall be in accordance with the law. Id § 40,
para. 2.
256 Id § 43, para. 1. Limitations on this freedom may be imposed by laws for public security, laws
for peace, order or public welfare, or laws of town planning. Id § 43, para. 2.
257 Id § 46. Concerning the history of this right see Aakesson, et al., supra note 46, at 678-79.
258 RADTHATHAMMANOON [Constitution] (B.E. 2534, Dec. 9, 1991) § 31. See generally Kittipong
Kittayarak, Toward Equal Justice: The Right To Counsel In Thailand, 6 CHULALONGKORN L. REV. 98-125
(1989-90).
259 RADTHATHAMMANOON [Constitution] (B.E. 2534, Dec. 9, 1991) § 35, para. 1. This paragraph
also indicates that the limitation of property rights shall be in accordance with law. Id Section 36 deals
specifically with expropriation. See id § 36.
260 Id § 48, para. 1. This is a new provision not found in previous Thai constitutions. See New
Charter to Protect Rights, BANGKOK POST WKLY. REV., June 21, 1991, at 1. The numerous limitations on
the new rights are noted in § 48, para. 2 of the 1991 Constitution.
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Many of the provisions recognizing these rights also severely limit
the rights by indicating that they exist only to the extent they are not
governed by other laws.261 One commentator has noted that: "To grant a
right yet immediately qualify that its exercise must be 'in accordance with
the provisions of the law' is to create ambiguity, leaving that 'right' subject
to interpretations of transient governmental majorities. '262  Moreover,
Section 49 of the 1991 Constitution provides a broad limitation on the use
of the rights provisions of the Constitution: "Persons may not exercise the
rights and freedoms as prescribed under this Chapter against the country,
religion, the King, and the Constitution. '263 Finally, there is no direct
avenue for judicial review on constitutionality questions except through the
Constitutional Tribunal. Thus, it can be argued that there is no effective
means for the eiforcement of rights, or since the Constitutional Tribunal
can only determine constitutionality of legislation, of obtaining a remedy.264
In sum, while theoretically the highest law of the land, the Thai Constitution
limits its own power and ability to protect the rights of the Thai people.265
V. CONCLUSION
Of the numerous questions that can be raised regarding the 1991 Thai
Constitution, two seem to be of most importance: 1) Does the Constitution
matter in Thailand?; and 2) Will the 1991 Constitution survive?
The Constitution does matter in Thailand. Questions about the
content and workings of the Constitution were prominent during the
political crisis of 1991-92. The Constitution was one means of defusing the
tensions created by shifting power balances. Large demonstrations and
vociferous criticism erupted concerning certain aspects of the Constitution.
All of these happenings indicate that the Constitution does matter, but one is
required to ask to whom it matters. In the past, the military has shown a
disregard for existing constitutions coupled with an intense interest in the
next constitution. The functional level of government, the bureaucracy,266
261 See the limitations noted supra notes 245, 247-5 1, and 254-56.
262 Engkagul, supra note 78, at 99.
263 RADTHATHAMMANOON [Constitution] (B.E. 2534, Dec. 9, 1991) § 49.
264 Engkagul, supra note 78, at 100.
265 Samudavanija, supra note 4, at 321.
266 The overwhelming dominance of the government bureaucracy in Thai politics and policy-
making has led one authority to refer to Thailand as a "bureaucratic polity." See FRED RIGGS, THAILAND:
THE MODERNIZATION OF A BUREAUCRATIC POLITY (1966). For a summary of the meaning of the term
bureaucratic polity see ANEK LAOTHAMATAS, BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS AND THE NEW POLITICAL
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appears to have been little constrained by any of the constitutions that have
existed in Thailand, and the 1991 model is similar in this respect. Elected
representatives must rely on the Constitution for authority, but it is not
unreasonable to question their commitment to any particular constitutional
framework.267 The educated elite and growing middle class of Bangkok,
supported by much of the Bangkok print media, appear increasingly
committed to Thailand having a bona fide constitutional government.
However, outside Bangkok and amongst the vast majority of the population
the Constitution is foreign and of little concern.268 In contrast to courts in
some countries which view themselves as the protectors of the constitution,
the Thai judiciary, irrespective of its prestige and independence, has in the
past and is now only indirectly involved with the constitution. While the
evidence indicates the constitution does matter in Thailand, it is not easy to
identify precisely to whom it matters sufficiently for there to develop a
strong sense that the written constitution should constrain or direct their
actions.
Given this ambiguity, it must be asked whether the 1991 Constitution
will survive. Most problematic is that transitions of power pursuant to a
constitution have been rare, and even when they do occur, they are
frequently followed by unconstitutional usurpations of power. Most notable
was the 1988 transition to power of the Chatichai administration pursuant to
elections and the 1978 Constitution which ended in inilitary overthrow in
1991. The 1991 coup has been described as "a shocking assault on the
notion that Thailand had successfully institutionalized democratic and
ECONOMY OF THAILAND 1-4 (1992). In his book, Laothamatas argues that there has been a decline of the
bureaucratic polity and the emergence of "liberal corporatism," i.e., private sector business. Id at 4-15,
149-63. Also, on the importance of bureaucracy in Thailand see GIRLING, supra note 55, at 135-39, 7-153.
More generally on the history and operation of the Thai bureaucracy see Chai-anan Samudavanija, The
Bureaucracy, in GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF THAILAND 75-109 (Somsakdi Xuto ed., 1987).
267 The basis of this questioning is the fickle nature of many Thai politicians. The elected leaders
overthrown by military coup in 1991, supported the military following the post-1992 elections. A principal
opposition leader against the coup leaders, himself a former military supreme commander, was the mentor
of the coup leader General Suchinda. See Neher, supra note 3, at 600. Pragmatic politics might be said to
be taken to extremes in Thailand. A recent outburst in the House of Representatives by an opposition
member who commented, "[1]t might be better to ask the military to take it [democracy] back", is an indi-
cation of the view of civilian, democratic rule even within the elected chamber. Rodney Tasker, Sounds of
Silence, FARE. ECON. REV., Mar. 18, 1993, at 13.
268 Tongdhamazhart gives three reasons for the lack of interest by the general Thai population in
the constitution: 1) the constitution was not written by the people and has no importance in their daily life;
2) there is little understanding of the constitution or what it is; and 3) the people have not grown up with
the constitution - they "believe that the monarchy, and not the constitution, is the fountain of justice and
law." Tongdhamazhart, supra note 34, at 63.
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civilian government. ' 269 Thus, it is simply too difficult to assess whether
the 1991 Constitution could survive political turmoil, weak leadership,
indecision, economic malaise, a reassertion of military bravado and
prestige, a new monarch, or any of the other events that could transpire in
the next decade.
Yet, it is also difficult not to be optimistic about the 1991
Constitution and the attention being given constitutional reform. Thailand
of the 1990s is not Thailand of the 1970s or earlier periods. There is
unquestionable interest in constitutional government and in making
operational written constitutional practices. One authority asserts that
"constitutionalism is where national history, custom, religion, social values
and assumptions about government meet positive law, economic force, and
power politics. ' 270 With so many complex variables involved, it is
therefore not surprising that the future of the 1991 Constitution and
constitutionalism in Thailand is less than clear.
269 Neher, supra note 3, at 595.
270 Beer, supra note 29, at 2.
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